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Questioning Marks:  
Plurality Decisions and  
Precedential Constraint 
Ryan C. Williams* 
Abstract. Understanding the precedential significance of Supreme Court plurality 
decisions is a task that has long confounded lower court judges. Surprisingly, the Supreme 
Court has offered little direct guidance on this question apart from a single sentence in 
Marks v. United States, which instructed that where the Justices fail to converge on a single 
majority rationale, the “holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” But this 
single, cryptic directive from a decision handed down more than four decades ago offers 
little meaningful guidance to lower courts struggling to apply the “narrowest grounds” 
rule to the Court’s fractured majority decisions. 
This Article suggests a new approach to plurality precedent that focuses on connecting the 
lower courts’ precedential obligations to the actual majority agreements among the 
Justices from which plurality decisions result. The defining feature of a plurality decision 
is an agreement among a majority of Justices on the appropriate judgment in a particular 
case without a corresponding majority agreement on the reasons why that judgment was 
correct. As such, the judgment itself provides the natural focal point for determining the 
lower courts’ precedential obligations. By focusing on the Court’s judgment and the 
rationales for that judgment endorsed by the various factions of concurring Justices, lower 
courts can identify a universe of subsequent cases that are sufficiently “like” the precedent 
case to demand consistent treatment—namely, those cases in which each of the judgment-
supportive rationales would compel the same result. This approach binds lower courts 
without constraining them to follow a rationale that was endorsed by only a minority 
faction on the Court. The approach thus promises to constrain lower courts’ 
decisionmaking to some extent while identifying a domain of bounded discretion in 
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which such courts remain free to continue working through the complicated legal 
questions the Court was unable to answer definitively in the original plurality decision.  
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Introduction 
Justice William Brennan famously quipped that a critical skill for a Justice 
of the Supreme Court was the ability to count to five.1 But with due respect to 
Justice Brennan, knowing how to “count to five” is at least as important for 
lower court judges forced to grapple with the Supreme Court’s decisions. After 
all, if a majority of the Court’s members cannot agree on what governing law 
requires, they are free to issue separate opinions expressing their own personal 
views of the law. Where such disagreements prevent the Court from 
converging on a single majority rationale for the outcome in a case—
notwithstanding majority agreement on what that outcome should be—the 
result is a plurality decision.2 
Judges in the lower courts do not possess such interpretive freedom. 
According to longstanding and widely accepted legal norms, lower court 
judges are strictly bound by controlling Supreme Court precedent regardless of 
their own views of the merits.3 But the Supreme Court has provided such 
courts with frustratingly little guidance regarding how they should understand 
the precedential effect of the Court’s own plurality decisions. The Court’s 
clearest directive on the subject was set forth in a single sentence of a decision 
handed down more than four decades ago—Marks v. United States.4 The so-
called “narrowest grounds rule” that derives from Marks instructs that when 
the Justices fail to converge on a single majority rationale for a decision, “the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”5  
But this cryptic directive leaves many questions regarding the precedential 
force of Supreme Court plurality decisions unanswered. For example, does 
Marks require lower courts to search for a single “narrowest” opinion issued in 
the precedent-setting case and accord that opinion full stare decisis effect? 
 
 1. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam, William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 29, 32 
(1997) (“Justice Brennan used to joke that a critical talent for a Supreme Court Justice 
was the ability to count to five.”); Abner Mikva, The Scope of Equal Protection, 2002 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 8 (“[A]s the late Justice Brennan used to say, the first rule of the 
Supreme Court is that you have to be able to count to five.”). 
 2. See James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 
517 (2011) (“Plurality decisions occur when a majority of Justices agree upon the result 
or judgment in a case but fail to agree upon a single rationale in support of the 
judgment.”). 
 3. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 817, 818 (1994) (“[L]ongstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to 
follow a precedent established by a court ‘superior’ to it.”). 
 4. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 5. Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
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Many lower court judges believe that it does—even where the putatively 
“narrowest” opinion reflects the reasoning of only one of the Court’s nine 
members.6 But others disagree, finding it inappropriate to accord binding effect 
to portions of a putatively “narrowest” opinion in which a majority of Justices 
did not explicitly or implicitly acquiesce.7 Even if lower court judges could 
agree on an answer to this first question, there would remain a further 
unanswered question regarding what criteria of “narrowness” they should use 
to identify the “narrowest grounds” of decision in the precedent case.8 Yet 
another unanswered question involves what role, if any, dissenting opinions 
should play in the Marks analysis.9 These and other questions regarding the 
proper application of the Marks framework have long bedeviled lower courts’ 
efforts to identify the controlling portions of Supreme Court plurality 
decisions.  
The conceptual confusion surrounding Marks presents an important 
practical challenge for lower courts. Although Supreme Court plurality 
decisions were historically rare, they have grown more frequent since the mid-
twentieth century and are now a familiar feature of the Court’s decisionmak-
ing.10 As many Court watchers have observed, plurality decisions often occur 
in cases involving especially difficult and highly salient legal issues on which 
 
 6. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that “[e]ven 
though eight Justices disagreed with Justice Sotomayor’s approach [in Freeman v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011),] and believed it would produce arbitrary and 
unworkable results, her reasoning” was nonetheless controlling under Marks (citation 
omitted)); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that Justice Powell’s opinion controlled in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), even though “none of the other Justices fully agreed with 
Justice Powell’s opinion”).  
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (concluding that the 
“narrowest opinion” under Marks “must represent a common denominator of the 
Court’s reasoning” and “must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five 
Justices who support the judgment” (emphasis omitted) (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 
F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc))). 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872 (2d Cir. 1981) (observing that the 
Supreme Court has not “elaborated on what was meant by ‘narrowest grounds’”); cf. 
Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC, 792 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015) (“For 
some issues, asking which of two opinions is narrower is akin to asking, ‘Which is 
taller, left or right?’”).  
 9. Compare, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2011) (interpreting 
Marks and subsequent Supreme Court opinions to require that lower courts “examine 
the dissenting Justices’ views to see if there is common ground” among a majority as to 
a rationale), with, e.g., King, 950 F.2d at 783 (“[W]e do not think we are free to combine a 
dissent with a concurrence to form a Marks majority.”). 
 10. See Spriggs & Stras, supra note 2, at 519 (reporting that the Supreme Court issued only 
45 plurality decisions between 1801 and 1955 but issued 195 plurality decisions between 
1953 and 2006). 
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public opinion is sharply divided.11 Some of the most significant and divisive 
Supreme Court cases in recent history—involving such issues as abortion,12 
gun control,13 voting rights,14 affirmative action,15 capital punishment,16 and 
the scope of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause17—have been 
decided by plurality decision. At the same time, the effects of plurality decisions 
extend well beyond such high-profile contexts. The proper interpretation of 
plurality precedent also matters for a variety of less prominent legal issues  
that nonetheless carry substantial importance to the workaday business  
of the federal courts, such as criminal procedure,18 sentencing,19 personal 
jurisdiction,20 class certification,21 and federal preemption of state law.22 
 
 11. See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court 
Plurality Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 32 (2009) (“[P]lurality decisions are important to 
study because they tend to occur in highly salient issue areas such as civil liberties and 
civil rights.” (citation omitted)); Spriggs & Stras, supra note 2, at 527 (“[P]lurality 
decisions tend to occur in difficult and highly salient cases . . . .”). 
 12. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 13. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (concerning incorporation of the 
Second Amendment against state governments). 
 14. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (challenging Indiana’s 
voter identification law). 
 15. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (challenging the 
constitutionality of racial preferences in public contracting); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (challenging racial preferences in higher education). 
 16. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (addressing the permissible methods of capital 
punishment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reaffirming capital punishment’s 
constitutionality). 
 17. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (challenging Congress’s 
authority to require that certain individuals either acquire health insurance or pay a 
penalty). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 988, 994 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting 
the difficulty of applying the narrowest grounds rule to discern the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), regarding whether particular 
statements prepared in the course of an investigation were “testimonial” for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 
95-96 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting the same difficulty). 
 19. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 722 F.3d 361, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting the divergence of 
lower court opinion regarding proper interpretation of the federal sentencing 
guidelines resulting from differing understandings of the Supreme Court’s plurality 
decision in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011)). 
 20. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying 
Marks analysis to the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in J. McIntyre Machinery,  
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011)); AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 
1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (engaging in the same inquiry).  
 21. See, e.g., In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F. Supp. 2d 642, 659-60 (E.D. Mich. 2011) 
(applying Marks to determine the holding of the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010)); McKinney v. 
footnote continued on next page 
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By their nature, plurality decisions implicate a tension between two 
distinct but closely related forms of precedential obligation. The first of these 
obligations requires precedent-following courts to reconcile their decisions 
with the precedent court’s specific judgment—that is, its specification of which 
party won, which party lost, and the nature of the relief awarded, if any. The 
second obligation requires that such courts also conform their decisionmaking 
to the more generally applicable rules and rationales on which the precedent-
setting court relied in reaching that judgment.23  
These two forms of precedential obligation usually support and reinforce 
one another. The traditional common law conception of a decision’s binding 
effect—reflected in the notion of the ratio decidendi (literally, the court’s “reason 
for deciding”)24—presupposes such a connection by limiting a decision’s 
precedential force to those portions of the deciding court’s reasoning that were 
necessary to its judgment.25 In cases that result in a plurality decision, this 
presupposed connection between result and rationale is lacking. Because the 
Justices whose votes were collectively necessary to the judgment do not agree 
with each other on the appropriate rationale, it is not possible to identify a 
single opinion from the precedent case as reflecting the controlling ratio.  
But the inability to pick out a single opinion from the plurality case as 
reflecting the controlling ratio does not render the ratio decidendi approach to 
precedent unworkable. This Article proposes a revised approach to plurality 
precedent that builds from the ratio decidendi model’s core premise: namely, 
that the precedential effect of a judicial decision should be determined by 
reference to the deciding court’s reasons for judgment. 
 
Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 746-47 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (engaging in the same 
analysis). 
 22. See, e.g., Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 218, 224 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying 
Marks to determine the precedential effect of the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)); In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151 n.4 (D. Minn. 2009) (parsing the same 
opinion). 
 23. See James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41, 52-57 (1979) (discussing the 
relationship between “rule” stare decisis and “result” stare decisis); cf. Caminker, supra 
note 3, at 865-66 (discussing justifications for lower court obedience to Supreme Court 
precedent more generally). 
 24. Ratio Decidendi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 25. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2013) (describing ratio decidendi as the idea that “the holding of a 
case is the rule that is logically implied by the stated reasons necessary to the resolution 
of the case on the facts before the appellate court and the legal arguments presented by 
the parties”); see also, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND 
MORALITY 184 (2d ed. 2009) (“Essentially the ratio is the reason(s) by which the court 
justifies its decision.”). 
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This revised approach starts from the recognition that plurality decisions 
involve a special kind of incompletely theorized agreement.26 Specifically, the 
defining feature of a plurality decision is agreement among a majority of the 
Justices on the case judgment without any comprehensive agreement on the 
reasons why that judgment was correct. But the scope of the Justices’ agreement 
will rarely be limited to the specific factual details of the particular dispute. 
Rather, the majority Justices will typically support their conclusions by 
reference to more generally applicable reasons for why the case should be 
decided in a particular way.  
Though no single opinion in such a case provides a comprehensive account 
of why the winning party won and the losing party lost, the collective set of the 
opinions that were together necessary to the judgment can supply such 
information. Where a case results in a plurality decision, the winning party 
won and the losing party lost because each of the judgment-supportive 
opinions compelled that outcome. By looking to this shared agreement among 
the majority Justices, lower courts can identify the universe of cases that are 
sufficiently “like” the precedent case to demand consistent treatment. This 
universe consists of those cases in which the reasons provided by each of the 
Justices whose vote was necessary to the judgment in the precedent case would 
compel the same result.  
Of course, this approach leaves lower courts without binding precedential 
guidance in an important category of cases, namely those in which resolution 
requires choosing from among the various judgment-supportive rationales 
from the precedent case. But the resulting discretion available to lower courts 
is a direct result of the Supreme Court’s own inability to converge on a single 
rationale. The Supreme Court’s failure to reach majority consensus on the 
controlling rationale can thus be seen as an implicit decision not to resolve that 
issue for the lower courts and an implicit delegation of authority to those 
courts to continue addressing the issue in the manner they did before the 
Supreme Court intervened. But even in this category of cases, the plurality 
decision may still exert some meaningful constraining force by closing off 
certain rationales that may otherwise have been available to the lower courts, 
including any rationale that would have led to a different result in the 
precedent case itself. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly outlines the origins of the 
Marks narrowest grounds rule and describes three distinct approaches to that 
rule that are discernible in the lower courts’ decisions: (1) the “implicit 
consensus” approach, which views the narrowest grounds rule as applicable to 
 
 26. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 11-14 (1999) (describing various kinds of “incompletely theorized agreements,” 
including agreements about “concrete particulars” reached in the face of “disagreements 
or uncertainty about the basis for those concrete particulars” (emphasis omitted)). 
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only a limited subset of plurality decisions involving logically “nested” or 
“telescoping” rationales; (2) the “fifth vote” approach, which treats as binding 
the opinion reflecting the views of the median or “swing” Justice in the 
precedent case; and (3) the “issue-by-issue” approach, which involves looking 
across all of the opinions in the case—including the plurality, concurrences, 
and dissents—to find points of agreement on discrete legal issues that were 
endorsed by a majority of the participating Justices. Part I also briefly discusses 
the inconsistent and haphazard treatment the Supreme Court has given its 
own plurality precedents in the decades following Marks.  
Part II introduces and describes a revised approach that focuses on identify-
ing the overlapping agreement among the majority Justices regarding why the 
particular judgment in the precedent case was correct. Under this “shared 
agreement” approach to plurality precedent, lower courts are tasked with 
identifying, from the various judgment-supportive opinions in the precedent 
case, the universe of future cases in which each of the judgment-supportive 
rationales from the plurality decision would compel the same result. This set of 
mutually agreed-upon results forms the basis for the lower courts’ precedential 
obligation. Any result that would have been reached under every one of the 
judgment-supportive rationales constitutes a result that the lower court itself 
is similarly bound to reach in the later case. Where, however, the result would 
depend on a choice between two or more conflicting rationales from the 
precedent case, lower courts will typically enjoy a limited domain of 
interpretive discretion allowing them to choose which of the competing 
rationales reflects the best view of governing law. 
Part III contends that this shared agreement approach to plurality prece-
dent reflects a better way of understanding lower courts’ precedential 
obligations than any of the three current approaches to the narrowest grounds 
rule. The shared agreement approach is consistent with the language and 
holding of Marks and fits comfortably with the handful of post-Marks decisions 
in which the Supreme Court has explicitly invoked the narrowest grounds 
doctrine. The shared agreement approach also best accords with traditional 
conceptions of precedential legitimacy, which limit precedential effect to 
statements that are both supported by a majority of the Justices and necessary 
to the judgment in the precedent-setting case. Finally, by allowing lower courts 
a limited degree of interpretive freedom, the shared agreement approach holds 
out the possibility that the Supreme Court might benefit from the lower courts’ 
continued engagement with the complex legal questions that divided the 
Justices in the precedent case. 
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Part IV illustrates how the shared agreement approach would operate in 
practice by considering its application to a recent Supreme Court plurality 
decision—Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.27 
I. Marks v. United States and Its Discontents 
A. Marks and the “Narrowest Grounds” Rule 
A full understanding of the Supreme Court’s canonical guidance to lower 
courts regarding the precedential effect of its plurality decisions requires a brief 
review of the case in which that guidance was delivered: Marks v. United 
States.28 Marks involved a due process challenge to the petitioners’ criminal 
obscenity convictions. The petitioners contended that their convictions were 
based on the retroactive application of a restrictive First Amendment standard 
the Supreme Court had articulated only after their allegedly criminal conduct 
had occurred.29  
To understand the basis of the petitioners’ challenge, it is necessary to have 
a basic understanding of the three First Amendment precedents that were 
central to their argument. In the earliest of the three cases, Roth v.  
United States,30 the Supreme Court articulated a standard to determine the 
constitutional permissibility of obscenity prosecutions. This standard asked 
“whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, 
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient 
interest.”31  
Nine years later, the Court revisited Roth in A Book Named “John Cleland’s 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General,32 a plurality decision in 
which the Justices divided over the appropriate First Amendment standard. 
Justices Black and Douglas joined an opinion endorsing a categorical rule 
prohibiting all “governmental action aimed at suppressing obscenity.”33 Justice 
 
 27. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 28. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 29. Id. at 189-91.  
 30. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 31. Id. at 489. 
 32. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
 33. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; see also Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421 (Black & Stewart, JJ., concurring 
in the judgment) (noting that Justice Black “concur[s] in the reversal for the reasons [he] 
stated in” Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); and 
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)); id. at 428 (Douglas, 
J., concurring); cf. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Federal 
Government is without any power . . . to put any type of burden on speech and 
expression of ideas of any kind [including obscenity].”). 
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Stewart, writing only for himself, would have confined obscenity prosecutions 
to a narrow category of cases involving “hardcore pornography.” 34 The 
plurality opinion, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Fortas, articulated a new three-part test for assessing 
whether the Roth standard, “as elaborated in subsequent cases,” had been met.35 
This new test added two further requirements to the Roth standard: that the 
allegedly obscene material be (1) “patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary community standards relating to the description or 
representation of sexual matters” and (2) “utterly without redeeming social 
value.”36 Three Justices dissented in separate opinions, urging application of 
either the Roth standard or an even less speech-protective standard.37  
Seven years after Memoirs, in Miller v. California, a clear majority of the 
Court rejected each of the proposed standards endorsed by the Justices 
concurring in Memoirs and instead endorsed a new standard that was 
substantially similar to the earlier articulated Roth standard.38  
This shifting First Amendment background set the stage for Marks. The 
petitioners in Marks were charged with obscenity based on conduct that 
occurred after Memoirs but before Miller, and they were convicted after Miller 
had been decided.39 The trial court instructed the jury under the newly 
articulated Miller standard, and the jury convicted.40 The court of appeals 
affirmed the conviction, rejecting the petitioners’ retroactivity challenge and 
noting that the standard on which the petitioners’ challenge relied—the three-
part test endorsed by the Memoirs plurality—“had never been approved by a 
plurality of more than three Justices at any one time.”41  
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Memoirs had, in fact, 
changed the applicable First Amendment standard and that applying the later-
announced Miller standard to the defendants’ conduct was therefore 
impermissible. In so deciding, the Marks Court instructed that “[w]hen a 
fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
 
 34. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; see also Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421 (Black & Stewart, JJ., concurring 
in the judgment) (noting that Justice Stewart “concur[s] in the reversal for the reasons 
[he] stated” in Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 497 (Stewart, J., dissenting); and Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 
518 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
 35. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (plurality opinion). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 441 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 456 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 461 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 38. 413 U.S. 15, 27-29 (1973). 
 39. Marks, 430 U.S. at 189-90. 
 40. Id. at 190-91. 
 41. United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
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that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.’”42 Applying this narrowest grounds test, the Marks Court 
concluded that Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion constituted the holding of 
Memoirs.43 
B. Marks in the Lower Courts: Three Different Ways of Counting to Five 
Marks foreclosed what may have been the easiest way for lower courts to 
deal with Supreme Court plurality decisions—that is, by simply denying their 
precedential force and treating the various opinions issued in those decisions as 
mere persuasive authorities.44 But while Marks made clear that lower courts 
were required to accord at least some precedential effect to plurality decisions, 
the Court provided little guidance regarding precisely how lower courts 
should go about identifying which aspects of those decisions are binding. The 
Court’s cryptic instruction to treat as binding the “position taken by” the 
Justices “who concurred . . . on the narrowest grounds”45 has left a great many 
questions regarding the proper interpretation and application of Marks 
unanswered.  
This Part surveys three distinct approaches that lower courts have 
employed in seeking to discern the precedential effect of a Supreme Court 
plurality decision. The first of these approaches interprets Marks as limited to a 
narrow subset of plurality decisions reflecting a clearly discernible “implicit 
consensus” or “common denominator” among the Justices. The second 
approach understands Marks as an instruction to lower courts to identify the 
opinion in a plurality decision that reflects the judgment-critical vote—
typically the fifth concurring vote—and treat that opinion as the Court’s 
holding. The third and final approach looks for points of majority consensus 
 
 42. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (plurality opinion) (“Since five Justices 
wrote separately in support of the judgments in [Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972)], the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .”). 
 43. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193-94.  
 44. Prior to Marks, several lower courts had embraced this understanding of plurality 
decisions’ precedential effect. See, e.g., Wiesenfeld v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 
367 F. Supp. 981, 988 (D.N.J. 1973); Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: 
Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 
420 (1992). Some state courts still adhere to this view regarding the precedential 
significance of their own plurality decisions. See, e.g., Rowland v. Washtenaw Cty. Rd. 
Comm’n, 731 N.W.2d 41, 47 n.7 (Mich. 2007) (“[D]ecisions in which no majority of the 
justices participating agree with regard to the reasoning are not an authoritative 
interpretation under the doctrine of stare decisis.”). 
 45. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15). 
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among different factions of concurring and dissenting Justices on distinct legal 
issues raised by the plurality decision. 
Though commentators have recognized each of these three approaches as a 
distinct way of understanding what the narrowest grounds rule requires,46 the 
distinction is often blurred or glossed over in lower court opinions applying 
the Marks doctrine.47 And most lower courts have not been particularly 
consistent in applying a single approach.48 Thus, for example, different panels 
within the same circuit court of appeals will often adopt different approaches 
depending on the particular plurality decision that is being considered.49 This 
doctrinal confusion among lower courts regarding the proper application of 
Marks has produced a series of longstanding circuit splits that have resulted 
from lower courts’ disagreements regarding how the narrowest grounds rule 
should apply to particular Supreme Court plurality decisions.50 
 
 46. See, e.g., John P. Neuenkirchen, Plurality Decisions, Implicit Consensuses, and the Fifth-Vote 
Rule Under Marks v. United States, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 387, 408 (2013) (contrasting the 
“implicit consensus,” or common denominator, approach with the “fifth vote” 
approach); Michael L. Eber, Comment, When the Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting 
Majorities and the Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 207, 239-41 (2008) 
(contrasting the common denominator, or “command model,” approach with the issue-
by-issue, or “prediction model,” approach). 
 47. See Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and 
Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 170 n.49 (2009) (noting the tendency of some 
lower courts to treat mutually inconsistent understandings of the Marks narrowest 
grounds rule “as if they are but two prongs of the same analysis”). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Our cases 
interpreting Marks have not been a model of clarity.”). 
 49. Compare, e.g., Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 807 n.17 (10th Cir. 
2009) (“Given that [Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005),] was decided by a plurality, 
the separate opinion of Justice Breyer, who supplied the ‘decisive fifth vote,’ is 
controlling under the rule of Marks.” (citations omitted) (quoting Heideman v. S. Salt 
Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003))), with, e.g., United States v. Carrizales-
Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In practice, . . . the Marks rule produces a 
determinate holding ‘only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader 
opinions.’” (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc))). Some 
circuit courts have even commented on this internal inconsistency. See, e.g., Lisk v. 
Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC, 792 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e 
apparently have taken as many as three different approaches [to the narrowest grounds 
rule]—or we at least have articulated our approach three different ways—when 
confronting other fragmented Supreme Court decisions.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Garland v. Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2010) (identifying a four-way 
circuit split regarding application of Marks to United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 
(2008), and rejecting all four in favor of a fifth distinct approach); Berkolow, Much Ado 
About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-
Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 334-44 (2008) (describing a 
circuit split regarding the proper application of Marks to the opinions in Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006)); B. Andrew Bednark, Note, Preferential Treatment: The 
Varying Constitutionality of Private Scholarship Preferences at Public Universities, 85 MINN. 
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1. The “implicit consensus” approach 
The “implicit consensus” approach interprets the Marks Court’s instruc-
tion to seek the “narrowest grounds” of a decision as workable only with 
respect to a limited subset of plurality decisions. As the D.C. Circuit explained 
in a seminal decision establishing the implicit consensus approach as its official 
understanding of Marks:  
Marks is workable—one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as “narrower” than 
another—only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions. In 
essence, the narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator of the 
Court’s reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five 
Justices who support the judgment.51 
As understood by the D.C. Circuit and other courts that have embraced a 
similar understanding of Marks, the narrowest grounds rule applies only in 
those circumstances “where it is clear that one opinion would apply in a subset 
of cases encompassed by a broader opinion”52 such that “the rationales for the 
majority outcome are nested, fitting within each other like Russian dolls.”53 
This particular alignment of opinions can be represented graphically using the 
Venn diagram depicted in Figure 1 below. 
 
L. REV. 1391, 1398-99 (2001) (identifying a three-court split as to the controlling 
opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
 51. King, 950 F.2d at 781; see also, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 
189 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 52. United States v. Robison, 521 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (Wilson, J., dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc); see also King, 950 F.2d at 781 (“Marks is  
workable . . . only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions.”).  
 53. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in 
Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1993). 
Plurality Decisions & Precedential Constraint 
69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
809 
Figure 1 





Figure 1 reflects a simple continuum in which the respective legal rules 
endorsed by the two “broader” opinions (Rules A and B) wholly subsume the 
rule endorsed by the “narrowest” opinion (Rule C). Consider, for example, the 
alignment of the three judgment-supportive opinions in Memoirs—the decision 
at issue in Marks itself.54 The broadest rationale supporting the judgment in 
that case—the proposed categorical ban on obscenity prosecutions endorsed by 
Justices Black and Douglas—corresponds to the circle labeled Rule A.55 The 
circles labeled Rule B and Rule C correspond, respectively, to the somewhat less 
speech-protective “hardcore pornography” rationale endorsed by Justice 
Stewart’s sole concurrence and the seemingly still-more-permissive three-part 
test endorsed by Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion.56 
 
 54. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (describing the various opinions in 
Memoirs). 
 55. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black’s concurring 
opinion). 
 56. See supra notes 34, 36 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stewart’s concurring 
opinion and Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion). Though the precise scope of Justice 
Stewart’s “hardcore pornography” standard is somewhat murky, most commentators 
have viewed Stewart’s proposed test as somewhat more speech-protective than the 
plurality’s standard. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739-40 (6th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc) (characterizing the Brennan plurality as providing “the most limited First 
Amendment protection” of the three concurring opinions in Memoirs), aff’d, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the 
Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 326-27 (2000) (assuming that 
Justice Stewart’s standard would protect a broader class of sexually explicit material 
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Where the opinions in the precedent case align in this way, the narrowest 
opinion can be seen as reflecting the core of an implicit consensus among the 
concurring Justices regarding the proper application of their respective 
rationales.57 For example, any obscenity prosecution deemed impermissible 
under Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Memoirs would necessarily be 
considered impermissible under the more speech-protective rationales 
endorsed by Justices Stewart, Black, and Douglas. Cases involving prosecutions 
that would be deemed impermissible under Justice Brennan’s three-part test 
thus represent the universe of cases in which the rationales of each Justice 
whose vote was necessary to the judgment in Memoirs would point to the same 
result.  
But not every plurality decision involves this particular alignment of 
judgment-supportive rationales. Many—if not most—plurality decisions 
involve situations in which the rationales of the various judgment-supportive 
opinions overlap in some respects but diverge in others. Figure 2 below 
illustrates this phenomenon. 
Figure 2 













The circles labeled Rule A, Rule B, and Rule C in Figure 2 have the same 
areas as the three identically labeled circles in Figure 1.58 But the set of results 
Rule C encompasses is no longer a subset of the results produced by either  
 
 57. See, e.g., Thurmon, supra note 44, at 428-32 (describing the “implicit consensus” rationale 
for the Marks rule). 
 58. In practice, there may be substantial practical measurement problems in comparing the 
scope of incompletely overlapping rationales to determine which rationale is 
“narrower” than the others. See United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 619 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (Williams, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).  
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Rule A or Rule B. Instead, Rule C now produces some results that would not 
have been endorsed by the Justices who endorsed either of the two alternative 
rationales. Thus, the implicit consensus justification for identifying Rule C as 
the “narrowest grounds” of the Court’s decision in the circumstances depicted 
in Figure 1 no longer applies.59  
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Rapanos v. 
United States.60 Rapanos addressed a challenge to the scope of the regulatory 
authority conferred on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) by the Clean 
Water Act (CWA).61 The CWA prohibits discharge of certain pollutants into 
“navigable waters” but authorizes the Corps to issue permits allowing discharge 
of “dredged or fill material” into such waters.62 The CWA defines the phrase 
“navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas.”63 The petitioners in Rapanos sought to develop certain wetlands that 
were not directly adjacent to any navigable waters but that lay “near ditches or 
man-made drains that eventually empty into traditional navigable waters.”64 
The Corps asserted that such development was impermissible under the CWA 
because the wetlands at issue constituted “‘waters of the United States’ that 
could not be filled without a permit.”65 
In Rapanos, a four-Justice plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia 
narrowly construed the phrase “waters of the United States,” as used in the 
CWA, to exclude “channels through which water flows intermittently or 
ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.”66 
Applying this definition, the plurality concluded that the Corps’s regulatory 
jurisdiction extended to only those wetlands having “a continuous surface 
connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right, so 
that there is no clear demarcation between ‘waters’ and wetlands.”67 Because 
the lower court had applied a different jurisdictional test in upholding the 
Corps’s exercise of jurisdiction and because of the “paucity of the record,” the 
plurality Justices believed the case should be remanded to determine whether 
jurisdiction existed.68  
 
 59. Cf. id. at 618 (“Without [the] requirement that one [rationale] be a subset of the other, 
the idea of ‘narrowness’ is inherently confusing and in fact indeterminate.”). 
 60. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 61. Id. at 720-22 (plurality opinion). 
 62. Id. at 723 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d)). 
 63. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2015). 
 64. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 729 (plurality opinion). 
 65. Id. at 720-21 (citation omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)). 
 66. Id. at 739. 
 67. Id. at 742. 
 68. Id. at 757. 
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In a sole concurrence, Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in rejecting the 
expansive interpretation of the statute that had been urged by the Corps but 
adopted a different jurisdictional test for determining the Corps’s regulatory 
authority.69 Under Justice Kennedy’s interpretation, wetlands would be subject 
to regulation if they possessed a “significant nexus” with navigable “waters of 
the United States,” meaning that the wetlands, “either alone or in combination 
with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily 
understood as ‘navigable.’”70 Like the plurality, Justice Kennedy believed the 
case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.71 
The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by three additional 
Justices, endorsed a broad interpretation of the CWA that would have 
authorized a much broader scope for regulation than either the plurality’s 
approach or Justice Kennedy’s approach.72 On the basis of that interpretation, 
the dissenters argued that the decision below should have been affirmed.73 
Although some lower courts have concluded that Justice Kennedy’s 
interpretation of the CWA would likely result in the invalidation of fewer 
federal regulations than would the plurality’s,74 the jurisdictional test he 
endorsed was not wholly subsumed within the plurality’s test and could 
potentially result in a finding of jurisdiction in at least some cases where the 
plurality’s test would not.75 For example, the plurality’s “continuous surface 
connection” test might allow for regulation of a very small stream flowing into 
an extremely large body of water, whereas the “significant nexus” test endorsed 
by Justice Kennedy might not.76 As a result, the implicit consensus approach 
would not single out any particular opinion from the case as the “narrowest.”77 
 
 69. Id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 70. Id. at 779-80. 
 71. Id. at 787. 
 72. Id. at 787-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 810. 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam) (concluding that Justice Kennedy’s rule would do less to “rein[] in federal 
authority”); cf. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I assume that 
Justice Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most cases because it treats more of 
the Nation’s waters as within the Corps’ jurisdiction . . . .” (formatting altered)). 
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that the 
plurality’s test might support jurisdiction in some cases where Justice Kennedy’s test 
would not and vice versa); Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724-25 (per curiam) (coming to the same 
conclusion). 
 76. See Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724-25 (per curiam) (acknowledging this possibility); cf. Rapanos, 
547 U.S. at 776-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[B]y saying the Act covers 
wetlands (however remote) possessing a surface-water connection with a continuously 
flowing stream (however small), the plurality’s reading would permit applications of 
footnote continued on next page 
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The implicit consensus approach thus offers limited guidance to lower 
courts regarding the controlling force of Supreme Court plurality decisions. 
Unless the rationales offered by the participating Justices happen to line up 
with one another along a simple continuum in the manner suggested by  
Figure 1 above, it is impossible to identify any single opinion as reflecting an 
implicit consensus among the Justices. Plurality decisions that fail to conform 
to this paradigm are either treated as wholly nonprecedential78 or, at most, 
limited to their “specific results.”79 The approach thus threatens to leave lower 
courts without meaningful precedential guidance with respect to many—
perhaps most—plurality decisions. 
2. The “fifth vote” approach 
A different understanding of the Marks Court’s instruction is reflected in 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.80 In Casey, the Third Circuit considered whether two then-recent 
Supreme Court plurality decisions had altered the standard of review 
applicable to laws regulating abortion. 81  In describing the precedential 
significance of those decisions, the Third Circuit interpreted the Marks 
narrowest grounds rule to require that “whenever possible, there be a single 
legal standard for the lower courts to apply in similar cases and that this 
standard, when properly applied, produce results with which a majority of the 
Justices in the case articulating the standard would agree.”82 To achieve this 
objective, the Casey court instructed that lower courts should treat as 
 
the statute as far from traditional federal authority as are the waters it deems beyond 
the statute’s reach.”). 
 77. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (noting the inability of the “implicit 
consensus” approach to identify a controlling opinion in cases involving partially 
overlapping rationales). 
 78. See, e.g., Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“[I]n cases where approaches differ, no particular standard is binding on an inferior 
court because none has received the support of a majority of the Supreme Court.”); 
United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The court in 
[Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980),] divided in such a way that no rule can be said 
to have resulted.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 2012) (“If there is no such narrow 
opinion [reflecting a common denominator of the deciding court’s reasoning], ‘the only 
binding aspect of a splintered decision is its specific result.’” (quoting United States v. 
Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005))). 
 80. 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 81. See id. at 687-88 (identifying the “threshold question” as “whether the standard of 
review of abortion regulations promulgated by the [Supreme] Court” in earlier 
decisions had “survived” two more recent plurality decisions).  
 82. Id. at 693. 
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controlling “the opinion of the Justice or Justices who concurred on the 
narrowest grounds necessary to secure a majority,” even if the opinion reflects 
the views of only one Justice.83 
The Third Circuit’s approach in Casey essentially views Marks as an 
instruction to search for the opinion reflecting the views of the Court’s median 
or “swing” Justice—typically, the fifth vote84—and accord that decision full 
precedential effect.85 The rationale for this “fifth vote” approach is usually 
premised on one of two alternative grounds: predictive power or constructive 
consent. The predictive rationale for the fifth vote approach is premised on the 
intuition that in any future case decided by the same group of Justices and 
involving the same set of issues, the median Justice’s view is likely to control.86 
The constructive consent rationale, on the other hand, is premised on the 
assumption that the median Justice’s preferred rationale is likely to reflect the 
position that the Court as a whole would have adopted if the Justices had been 
“forced to choose” a single rationale.87 Drawing on insights from social choice 
theory, Maxwell Stearns argues that the fifth vote approach provides a 
 
 83. Id. at 694 n.7 (emphasis omitted). The language quoted in the text addressed what the 
Casey court described as a “slightly more complex” circumstance in which “six or more 
Justices join in the judgment and they issue three or more opinions.” Id. But the court 
advanced a similar methodology for determining the controlling opinion in cases 
involving a more conventional split where only two opinions agree on the judgment. 
See id. at 693-94 (“In a constitutional case where (1) there is a 5-4 decision or where there 
are only two opinions in the majority and (2) the majority votes to uphold a law as 
constitutional, the ‘narrowest grounds’ principle will identify as authoritative the 
standard articulated by a Justice or Justices that would uphold the fewest laws as 
constitutional.”). 
 84. Where a case is heard by fewer than nine Justices, it is conceivable that the median vote 
necessary to produce a judgment could be provided by the fourth vote rather than the 
fifth. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2015) (providing that six Justices are sufficient to establish a 
quorum). 
 85. See Casey, 947 F.2d at 694 (emphasizing that the identified opinion “is as authoritative 
for lower courts as a nine-Justice opinion,” even if it reflects the views of only one 
Justice); see also, e.g., United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Ka-
vanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In most cases, the 
commonsense way to apply Marks is to identify and follow the opinion that occupies 
the middle ground between (i) the broader opinion supporting the judgment and (ii) the 
dissenting opinion.”); Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 465 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (“Because the other Justices [in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 
535 U.S. 425 (2002),] divided 4 to 4, and Justice Kennedy was in the middle, his views 
establish the holding.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 548 (1998) (book review) 
(contending that a “rational lower court” attempting to use a prior Supreme Court 
plurality decision to predict the Court’s future decisions “will simply find the position 
of the fifth Justice and treat this as the law”). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam) (interpreting Marks to require “lower-court judges . . . to follow the narrowest 
ground to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose”). 
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decision rule that will correctly identify the “Condorcet winner”— that is, the 
option that would prevail over all other options in a set of pairwise 
comparisons—with respect to most plurality decisions.88  
To illustrate the concept, Stearns uses the example of Memoirs itself. 
Stearns notes that the plurality’s preferred precedential rule occupied a middle 
point between the more speech-protective standards endorsed by the other 
concurring Justices and the less speech-protective standard endorsed by the 
dissenters.89 Stearns reasons that “if forced to choose among each of the 
remaining opinions, those writing or joining the opinions at the outer edge” of 
this continuum “would most prefer the one closest to them and least prefer the 
one farthest from them.”90 In other words, the dissenters would presumably 
prefer the plurality’s rationale to either of the more speech-protective 
concurrences, and the Justices who wrote or joined those concurrences would 
presumably prefer the plurality’s rationale to that of the dissenters. Based on 
this analysis, Stearns concludes that the Memoirs plurality represented the 
Condorcet winner in the case and infers that the narrowest grounds rule of 
Marks “is best understood as an application of the Condorcet criterion to 
fractured panel Supreme Court decisions.”91 
The fifth vote approach promises guidance with respect to a broader range 
of plurality decisions than does the implicit consensus approach. But it does so 
in a way that strikes many jurists and commentators as problematic. Perhaps 
most controversially, the fifth vote approach treats as binding all aspects of the 
opinion reflecting the median Justice’s views, including propositions that no 
other participating Justice explicitly or implicitly assented to.92 The fifth vote 
approach also implicitly accords weight to the views of dissenting Justices by 
allowing their views to influence the identification of the median Justice’s 
opinion.93 
 
 88. See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE 
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 45, 124-41 (2000) (arguing that a fifth 
vote approach to the Marks rule—that is, one that accords controlling significance to 
the views of the Court’s median Justice—will identify a Condorcet winner in most 
plurality decisions).  
 89. Id. at 128 tbl.3.5. 
 90. Id. at 128. 
 91. Id. at 129. 
 92. See, e.g., King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“When eight of nine 
Justices do not subscribe to a given approach to a legal question, it surely cannot be 
proper to endow that approach with controlling force, no matter how persuasive it 
may be.”); Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1360 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting “the 
anomaly of the views of one justice, with whom no one concurs, being the law of the 
land, where the Court is so divided on an issue and where there is no majority opinion 
at all”). 
 93. See Neuenkirchen, supra note 46, at 404; see also, e.g., United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 
604, 617 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
footnote continued on next page 
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But the fifth vote approach also sometimes fails to deliver clear guidance 
regarding the precedential effect of a plurality decision. Consider, for example, 
a hypothetical civil case brought against a foreign defendant in federal court 
where the defendant argues that the court lacks both subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Imagine that three Justices conclude that subject matter jurisdiction was 
lacking but refuse to reach the personal jurisdiction question. Suppose further 
that three other Justices believe personal jurisdiction is lacking and vote to 
dismiss on that ground without reaching the subject matter jurisdiction 
question. Finally, suppose that the three remaining Justices find both subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction and would thus allow the case to 
proceed in federal court. The fifth vote approach is unworkable in this context 
because the information provided by the various opinions in the case is 
insufficient to determine whether there is a dominant second-choice option 
that can be taken to reflect the views of the Court’s “median” or “swing” 
Justice.94 
The fifth vote approach may also fail to deliver clear guidance in cases that 
result in a “voting paradox” where one party “receives the votes of a majority 
of the Justices . . . on every relevant issue yet loses the case anyway.”95 Because 
the Court generally resolves cases by voting on the ultimate outcome rather 
than on distinct legal issues,96 it sometimes happens that the issue-level votes 
that can be inferred by looking to the Justices’ individual opinions  
conflict with the Court’s ultimate disposition.97 Such dispositions are possible 
whenever “two or more issues are presented to the Court, when no one way of 
resolving both issues gets majority support, and when there is also a dissent.”98 
In such cases, it is not possible to identify a single opinion reflecting the Justices’ 
median position because there are, in effect, multiple distinct “majorities” 
 
banc) (emphasizing the importance of looking to all opinions in the precedent case, 
including dissents, in order to identify the controlling fifth vote opinion). 
 94. See, e.g., David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and 
Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1072 
(1996) (arguing that because “judges need only declare their views on the issues that are 
dispositive for their own individual reasoning,” neither the public nor the judges 
themselves may know “whether or not the paradoxical situation pertains”). 
 95. Michael I. Meyerson, The Irrational Supreme Court, 84 NEB. L. REV. 895, 901 (2006). 
 96. David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by 
Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743, 750 (1992). 
 97. Two such voting paradox cases—McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and 
National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949)—are discussed 
in detail in Part II below. See infra notes 173-85 (discussing McDonald), 186-98 (discuss-
ing Tidewater).  
 98. David S. Cohen, The Precedent-Based Voting Paradox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 183, 185 (2010). 
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composed of different Justices who do not share a common ranking for the 
available options.99  
3. The “issue-by-issue” approach 
A third approach to identifying the “narrowest grounds” of decision under 
Marks involves “pars[ing]” each of the various opinions in the plurality case—
including the plurality opinion, concurrences, and dissents—“to determine 
each proposition where five or more Justices agree.”100 Like the fifth vote 
approach, this issue-by-issue approach purports to provide definitive guidance 
in at least some cases that do not conform to the “nested rationale” paradigm 
envisioned by the implicit consensus approach. 101 But the issue-by-issue 
approach avoids the fifth vote approach’s uncomfortable conclusion that the 
views of a single Justice can establish binding precedent for the Court. Instead, 
the issue-by-issue approach looks for specific propositions that have actually 
been explicitly or implicitly assented to by a majority of Justices, though 
perhaps not the same majority whose votes were necessary to the judgment in 
the precedent case.102  
 
 99. Consider, for example, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, which involved a corporation’s 
constitutional challenge to a federal law requiring it to fund lifetime health benefits for 
certain of its former employees. 524 U.S. 498, 514, 517 (1998) (plurality opinion). A four-
Justice plurality opinion authored by Justice O’Connor concluded that the law was an 
unconstitutional taking of private property, id. at 537, but expressed skepticism 
regarding the company’s claim that the law also violated its substantive due process 
rights, id. at 537-38. Justice Kennedy, writing only for himself, concluded that the 
company’s Takings Clause claim should be rejected but would have held the law’s 
application to the company a violation of substantive due process. Id. at 539 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Finally, the four dissenting 
Justices would have rejected both the company’s Takings Clause claim as well as its 
substantive due process claim. Id. at 554, 558-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Combining the 
votes from the various opinions in the case reveals a majority against each of the 
company’s two constitutional theories—takings and substantive due process—but the 
Court nonetheless concluded that the law was unconstitutional. See Cohen, supra note 
98, at 188-91 (using Eastern Enterprises to illustrate the phenomenon of a multiple-issue 
voting paradox). For a more detailed description of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a voting paradox to occur, see Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever 
Switch Votes?: Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87, 123-
27 (1999). 
 100. Eber, supra note 46, at 210; see also, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have looked to the votes of dissenting Justices if they, combined with 
votes from plurality or concurring opinions, establish a majority view on the relevant 
issue.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 659 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding 
that lower courts are “bound to follow the five-four vote against the takings claim” in 
Eastern Enterprises where four of those five votes were provided by the dissenters); cf. 
supra note 99 (describing the Eastern Enterprises opinions).  
 102. See Eber, supra note 46, at 223-25. 
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Consider again the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision. As discussed above 
in Part I.B.1, the plurality Justices and Justice Kennedy would have limited the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the Corps under the CWA but could not agree on a 
single standard for assessing such jurisdiction.103 The four dissenters in 
Rapanos joined an opinion authored by Justice Stevens that endorsed a much 
more permissive test that would have allowed for jurisdiction in each instance 
where such jurisdiction would be allowed under either the plurality’s proposed 
test or the alternative test proposed by Justice Kennedy. 104 Because the 
interpretation of the CWA that Justice Stevens and his three fellow dissenters 
preferred was broad enough to encompass all instances of regulatory authority 
that would have been allowed under either test, Justice Stevens asserted that 
the lower court on remand should find jurisdiction “if either of those tests is 
met.”105 
Justice Stevens’s proposal implicitly invited lower courts to view the 
various opinions in Rapanos as reflecting a set of implicit issue-by-issue votes 
on two distinct propositions—namely, (1) whether regulatory jurisdiction was 
permissible under the plurality’s proposed test and (2) whether such 
jurisdiction was permissible under Justice Kennedy’s proposed test. Eight 
Justices—the four plurality Justices and the four dissenters—would have 
answered the first question in the affirmative, while five Justices—the 
dissenters and Justice Kennedy—would have provided the same answer to the 
second question. Thus, there appears to have been clear majority support 
among the Justices who participated in Rapanos for finding jurisdiction under 
each jurisdictional test.106 Some lower courts have endorsed Justice Stevens’s 
reasoning, concluding that jurisdiction should be found in any instance where 
either test is satisfied.107 
Nonetheless, the issue-by-issue approach remains controversial because it 
requires that dissenters’ views be taken into account.108 Critics contend that the 
 
 103. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
 104. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 106. See Eber, supra note 46, at 209 (observing that Justice Stevens’s dissent “creat[ed] at least 
an eight- or five-vote majority in favor of federal CWA jurisdiction” in all instances 
covered by either test). 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting Justice 
Stevens’s proposed approach); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(adopting this same approach); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64-66 (1st Cir. 
2006) (adopting this same approach). 
 108. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the United 
States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 14 
(2006) (contending that “[n]othing in the dissent” in a plurality decision “constitutes a 
portion of the judgment of the Court, so nothing in the dissent” can be “part of the 
actual holding of the case” under Marks). 
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approach conflicts with the Court’s instruction that the holding of a case 
should be determined by looking to the “position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”109 Taking dissenters’ 
views into account also conflicts with the longstanding view that only 
statements in judicial opinions that are in some way “necessary” to the 
judgment in the precedent case are entitled to precedential effect.110 Because 
dissents, by definition, are not necessary to the judgment in the precedent case, 
they stand in a position similar to dicta and are thus, arguably, not entitled to 
precedential effect.111 
Moreover, the approach is only workable in cases involving a so-called 
“dual majority” alignment where “there are in effect two majorities: the 
plurality and concurrence agreeing on the result, and the concurrence and 
dissent agreeing on the fundamental legal principles involved.”112 Such an 
alignment will not be present in every plurality decision. Consider again the 
hypothetical plurality decision discussed above in Part I.B.2, where the 
majority of Justices agreed jurisdiction was lacking but could not agree on 
whether personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction provided the 
appropriate grounds for dismissal.113 The issue-by-issue approach would be 
unhelpful in extracting precedential guidance from such a decision because 
there are no points of consensus between the three dissenters—who believe the 
court possesses both subject matter and personal jurisdiction—and either 
faction of concurring Justices. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Indifference to the Practical Problems of Marks 
Given the confusion that has plagued lower courts’ efforts to apply the 
Marks narrowest grounds rule, it might be natural to expect the Supreme 
 
 109. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)); see also, e.g., United States v. 
Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In our view, Marks does not direct lower 
courts interpreting fractured Supreme Court decisions to consider the positions of 
those who dissented.”); King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc) 
(“[W]e do not think we are free to combine a dissent with a concurrence to form a 
Marks majority.”). But see Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65 (arguing that Marks does not preclude 
consideration of dissenters’ views). 
 110. See infra notes 146-51 (describing the necessity test for precedential significance). 
 111. See, e.g., In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 3:14-md-2516 (SRU), 2016 WL 4204478, at 
*6 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2016) (“[T]he common denominator of a concurrence and a dissent 
does not support the judgment. It is, in effect, Marks-doctrine dicta rather than Marks-
doctrine holding.”); see also infra note 270 (collecting additional sources expressing a 
similar view). 
 112. Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 756, 767-69 (1980) (describing such “dual majority” cases). 
 113. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (describing the hypothetical).  
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Court to step in with further clarifying guidance regarding how the rule 
should apply. Multiple individual Justices have expressed concern that the 
Court’s plurality decisions leave lower courts and litigants with insufficient 
guidance.114 And similar reservations regarding the workability of the Marks 
framework itself have found their way into the Court’s own opinions.115  
But despite the Justices’ awareness of the difficulties lower courts and 
litigants routinely encounter in attempting to apply the narrowest grounds 
rule, the Court has repeatedly passed on opportunities to provide lower courts 
with clearer guidance regarding the rule’s proper application.116 In the four 
decades since Marks was handed down, the Court has applied or considered the 
“narrowest grounds” framework in only seven majority opinions.117 In two of 
those opinions, the Court deemed the Marks analysis unhelpful, concluding 
that it did not seem “useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical 
possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that 
 
 114. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Remarks on the Process of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
263, 270 (1992) (“There must be an effort to get an opinion for at least a majority of the 
Court in every case where that is possible, in order that lower court judges and the 
profession as a whole may know what the law is without having to go through an 
elaborate head-counting process.”); Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing 
Separately, Jurisprudential Lecture at the University of Washington School of Law 
(May 11, 1989), in 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 148 (1990) (describing the “proliferation” of 
decisions without a clear majority as “unsettling”); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare 
Decisis and Judicial Restraint, Leslie H. Arps Lecture at the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York (Oct. 17, 1989), in 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 289 (1990) (“Splintered 
decisions provide insufficient guidance for lower courts . . . [and] promote disrespect for 
the Court as a whole . . . .”). 
 115. E.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994) (noting difficulties lower 
courts had encountered in seeking to apply Marks to the Court’s fractured opinion in 
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), and concluding that “[w]e think it not useful to 
pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously 
baffled and divided the lower courts which have considered it”); accord Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (reaching a similar conclusion regarding lower courts’ 
interpretation of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
 116. See, e.g., Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic 
Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 975 n.183 (2013) (“My review of cases applying Marks 
suggests that the Court does not intervene to prevent lower courts from fumbling 
around with plurality precedent.”). For example, notwithstanding significant 
disagreement among lower courts regarding the precedential effect of its decision in 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), the Supreme Court has “declined to clarify 
the issue by granting certiorari,” Michael Farrell, A Wetland Functions Approach to 
Applying the Opinions from the Rapanos Decision, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 61, 62 
(2015).  
 117. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2738 n.2 (2015); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 
949 (2007); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325; O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 160 (1997); 
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994); Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745; City of Lakewood v. 
Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988). 
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have considered it.”118 In the remaining five cases, the majority did single out 
either the plurality opinion or one of the concurrences from the earlier case as 
being the “narrowest” and therefore controlling opinion under Marks. But the 
Court did not explain in any case why the particular opinion so designated was 
“narrower” than the others or offer any guidance to lower courts regarding how 
the Marks analysis should be carried out. And three of those five decisions 
resulted in a dissenting opinion that accused the majority of misapplying the 
Marks framework.119  
Multiple factors feed into the Court’s failure to clarify the proper applica-
tion of Marks. Unlike lower courts, the Supreme Court itself possesses a 
significant degree of interpretive discretion in determining how much weight 
to give its own prior precedents.120 This means that where a clear majority of 
the Court in a subsequent case favors a rationale endorsed by one of the 
opinions issued in connection with an earlier plurality decision, that majority 
can simply dispense with the Marks analysis and endorse its preferred rationale 
directly.121 Moreover, even on the relatively rare occasions when the Court 
has explicitly engaged in the Marks analysis, the Court has sometimes 
concluded that the analysis is sufficiently complicated to render Marks 
unhelpful as an analytic tool.122  
At the same time, the narrowest grounds rule does point to a definitive 
resolution in a nontrivial subset of plurality decisions: those involving 
opinions reflecting logically “nested” or “telescoped” rationales. And the Court 
has sometimes found Marks at least rhetorically useful in singling out a 
particular holding of a plurality decision as the “narrowest” rationale.123 The 
Court has not, however, approached the Marks framework with anything like 
the theoretical rigor or consistency necessary to provide clear guidance to 
lower courts.124  
 
 118. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46); Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46. 
 119. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Panetti, 551 U.S. at 969 n.5 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); Romano, 512 U.S. at 22-23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 120. See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1861, 1865 (2014) (noting the frequency with which the Court “narrow[s]” its own 
prior precedents without overtly overruling them). 
 121. See Marceau, supra note 116, at 966 (observing that the Supreme Court itself often 
ignores Marks in dealing with its own prior plurality decisions). 
 122. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (“It does not seem ‘useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the 
utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts 
that have considered it.’” (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46)).  
 123. See supra notes 117-19 (discussing the handful of cases in which the Court specifically 
invoked the narrowest grounds doctrine). 
 124. See Marceau, supra note 116, at 987 (noting the Supreme Court’s “seeming indifference 
to its own Marks rule” and contending that the Court itself does not view the rule as, 
“in any ordinary sense, a binding precedent”); cf. State v. Kikuta, 253 P.3d 639, 658 n.14 
footnote continued on next page 
Plurality Decisions & Precedential Constraint 
69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
822 
Finally, even if the Justices of the Supreme Court were inclined to give 
further guidance regarding the proper application of Marks, the Justices—
much like the judges of the lower courts—seem to lack a coherent theory of 
precisely what the doctrine should aim to accomplish. The proper meaning of 
the Marks narrowest grounds rule has divided the Supreme Court in much the 
same way that it has divided the courts below.125  
II. A Fourth Way of Counting to Five: Plurality Precedent and 
Shared Agreement  
Given the confusion that has long surrounded plurality precedent in 
general and the Marks narrowest grounds rule in particular, some commenta-
tors have despaired of ever constructing a workable and coherent framework 
to guide lower court decisionmaking. 126  Even commentators who have 
proposed reforms to the Marks doctrine have sometimes characterized their 
efforts as “damage control,” viewing the task for lower courts as making the 
best of a bad situation the Supreme Court thrust upon them with its abdication 
of its institutional responsibility.127 The foregoing survey of the necessary 
tradeoffs and incompleteness of the doctrinal solutions lower courts have 
constructed to make sense of Marks certainly lends some support to such 
pessimistic diagnoses. 
This Part, however, provides a more optimistic perspective on the 
problem of plurality precedent. Much of the confusion that has surrounded the 
interpretation of plurality decisions derives from a failure of lower courts and 
commentators to accept such decisions for what they are—namely, 
 
(Haw. 2011) (observing that the Marks doctrine “has been applied very rarely and 
inconsistently by the Supreme Court”). 
 125. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988) (questioning 
the dissenting opinion’s reliance on combined views of dissenting and concurring 
Justices in an earlier plurality decision as inconsistent with Marks). Compare, e.g., 
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (identifying Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), as the narrowest grounds for the 
Court’s decision under Marks), with, e.g., id. at 969 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (question-
ing the majority’s application of Marks and contending that “it is difficult to say that 
Justice Powell’s opinion” in Ford was “merely a narrower version of the plurality’s 
view”). 
 126. See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 116, at 986-87 (dismissing the Marks narrowest grounds 
rule as “a pretend precedent . . . that has very little practical effect on the way that 
plurality precedent ought to be discerned by lower courts”); Adam S. Hochschild, Note, 
The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical 
Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 286 (2000) (“No ‘test’—recommended by the 
Supreme Court or otherwise—can dispel the confusion surrounding these plurality 
decisions.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Thurmon, supra note 44, at 447 (characterizing the author’s proposed revision 
to the Marks rule as “a form of damage control”). 
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incompletely theorized judicial agreements on particular judgments. The 
judgment in the precedent case provides the focal point of the majority of 
Justices’ agreement—indeed, the only aspect of the case on which a majority of 
the Court need agree. The judgment thus provides the natural starting point 
for assessing the decision’s precedential significance. This Part shows how the 
traditional common law notion of ratio decidendi provides both a useful 
framework within which to situate the problem of plurality precedent and a 
set of tools that lower courts can use to discern the binding precedential effect 
of such decisions. 
A. Stare Decisis and the Relationship Between Results, Rules, and 
Reasons 
The traditional starting point for assessing the scope of a given decision’s 
precedential constraint has long been the deciding court’s judgment—that is, 
the court’s specification of which party won, which party lost, and the relief 
awarded, if any.128 Some distinguished commentators on the common law 
have urged that only the result of the precedent-setting case should be treated as 
binding.129 Under this approach, the task of a precedent-following court is 
merely “to identify a theory that can explain the results of previous cases, 
regardless of whether the precedent-setting courts themselves adopted the 
superimposed theory.”130 The precedent court’s own explanation of the legal 
reasoning on which it based its decision—though perhaps entitled to some 
persuasive force—would not, on this view, be considered binding on precedent-
following courts.131 
 
 128. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 25, at 22 (describing the ratio decidendi conception of vertical 
stare decisis); Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1187, 1247 (2007) (observing that in the common law tradition, “the precedential value 
of a case lay in its outcome, or judgment”). 
 129. See infra note 131 (collecting sources). 
 130. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1045 
(2005). 
 131. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949) (“[The 
common law judge] is not bound by the statement of the rule of law made by the prior 
judge even in the controlling case. The statement is mere dictum . . . . It is not what the 
prior judge intended that is of any importance; rather it is what the present judge, 
attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, thinks should be the determining 
classification.”); Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE 
L.J. 161, 162 (1930) (“[T]he reason which the judge gives for his decision is never the 
binding part of the precedent.”); Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning 
Präjudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 210 (1933) (“[I]t is the decision 
itself which must be followed and not the opinion . . . .”). 
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But as numerous judges and scholars have recognized, this “results only” 
approach to stare decisis is unworkable.132 One key difficulty with this 
approach is its inability to specify precisely which facts in the precedent case 
should matter to the precedent-following court in determining the binding 
effect of an earlier precedent. No two cases are ever precisely the same, and it 
will thus always be possible to identify some factual distinction between a 
present case and some earlier case asserted as a potential precedent. This 
difficulty cannot be obviously remedied by disregarding “immaterial” or 
“unessential” factual differences between the two cases.133 As Henry Monaghan 
observes, “[t]he relevant facts” of a precedent case “do not identify and classify 
themselves; criteria are needed to determine what the legally relevant facts are 
and at what level of generality they are to be specified.”134 Looking to the 
precedent court’s own explanation of the reasoning through which it reached 
its result significantly eases this difficulty by providing a set of criteria through 
which to assess the materiality of any discernible factual similarities and 
differences between the two cases.  
Though traces of the facts-plus-outcome approach to precedent can still be 
glimpsed at times,135 the more common practice among modern courts is to 
give precedential effect to at least some aspects of the reasoning through which 
the precedent-setting court arrived at its decision.136 This approach binds 
 
 132. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 52-55 (1988) 
(criticizing the facts-plus-outcome approach to precedent); Abramowicz & Stearns, 
supra note 130, at 1045-46 (arguing that the facts-plus-outcome approach “simply fails 
to provide a positive explanation of judicial practice”); Larry Alexander, Constrained by 
Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 34-44 (1989) (criticizing the facts-plus-outcome approach 
and concluding that it “faces either indeterminacy or incoherence”); Michael C. Dorf, 
Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2009-40 (1994) (showcasing the limits of the 
facts-plus-outcome approach with the example of cases concerning the President’s 
removal power).  
 133. Cf. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES: A COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN READING 
AND STATING REPORTED CASES, COMPOSING HEAD-NOTES AND BRIEFS, CRITICISING AND 
COMPARING AUTHORITIES, AND COMPILING DIGESTS 14 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d 
ed. 1894) (acknowledging the inevitability of factual dissimilarities between cases but 
observing that “the obvious suggestion” to this difficulty “is that the differences may be 
immaterial”). 
 134. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
723, 764 (1988); see also, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 130, at 1055 (observing 
that “facts, material or otherwise, do not speak for themselves” and that a “satisfactory 
definition of holding and dicta must therefore examine the reasoning that connects the 
material facts to the result”).  
 135. See generally Dorf, supra note 132, at 2009-24 (surveying the manner in which the 
Supreme Court has applied this method to distinguish earlier precedents addressing the 
scope of the President’s removal authority).  
 136. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (“When an opinion issues for 
the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to 
that result by which we are bound.”); Dorf, supra note 132, at 2037 (“[W]hen they are 
footnote continued on next page 
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lower courts by both the specific result in the precedent case and the broader 
rule or rationale that the precedent court articulated in explaining  
that result.137 Ideally, these two forms of precedential obligation—sometimes 
referred to as “result stare decisis” and “rule stare decisis,” respectively138—
should work together to support and reinforce one another. Knowing the 
specific judgment the court reached in the precedent case helps concretize the 
more abstract rule or rationale on which the court relied by illustrating its 
application to a particular real-world dispute. At the same time, knowing the 
broader rule or rationale on which the precedent court relied helps lower 
courts generalize its result to other cases.139 
But this mutually reinforcing relationship between rule stare decisis and 
result stare decisis will not be present in every case. For example, a precedent-
setting court may issue an opinion that fails to clearly explain its judgment or 
may even issue a judgment unaccompanied by any explanation at all.140 Where 
such a decision is rendered, the conventional approach courts have taken has 
been to posit a precedential rule to explain the judgment, relying on either 
their “sense of what the earlier judges probably thought” or their “own 
judgment about what should have mattered.”141 Such a decision imposes 
substantially fewer constraints on lower courts’ decisionmaking because it 
allows them to posit a broad range of potential rationales that could account 
for the precedent court’s judgment. But even an unexplained judgment may 
exert some weak constraining force on later courts by necessitating that any 
newly developed rationale be capable of accounting for the specific result in 
the precedent case itself.142 
 
not busy circumventing precedent by abusing the holding/dictum distinction, judges 
typically pay a great deal of attention to the words as well as the results of judicial 
decisions.”). 
 137. Cf., e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 692 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The 
lower courts in constitutional matters universally follow both the Supreme Court’s 
choice of legal standard and the specific results the Court has reached by applying that 
legal standard.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 138. See Hardisty, supra note 23, at 52-57; Novak, supra note 112, at 758 n.10. 
 139. See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 205-06 (2013) 
(“One vital guide to a court’s view of material facts is its stated rules of law; but it is also 
true that its rule of law can best be understood in terms of the facts before it.”). 
 140. See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (discussing the precedential status of 
unexplained dispositions by the Supreme Court). 
 141. GREENAWALT, supra note 139, at 187; see also, e.g., RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, 
PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 47-48 (4th ed. 1991) (describing the reasoning process 
through which a lower court might “infer[]” such a rationale). 
 142. For example, in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), 
which declared racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court issued several unexplained per curiam decisions invalidating segregation in 
other types of public accommodations, see, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per 
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Rule stare decisis and result stare decisis may also diverge from one 
another where a court attempts to set forth a putatively binding precedential 
rule for future cases without connecting that rule to its specific judgment in 
the precedent case.143 Such cases implicate the famously blurry and contested 
boundary separating holdings from dicta.144 Despite its often elusive nature, 
the holding-dicta distinction is central to the common law theory of precedent. 
The distinction takes on added significance when applied to decisions issued by 
Article III courts, which by constitutional design are limited to issuing 
judgments in connection with particularized “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies” and 
foreclosed from offering authoritative declarations of law outside that specific 
context.145 
The most prominent modern formulation of the holding-dicta distinction 
focuses on the concept of “necessity” and regards only those aspects of a prior 
opinion that were in some way “necessary” to the deciding court’s judgment as 
part of the case’s holding.146 Despite the prominence of this definition, it is 
subject to some well-known criticisms. For example, the necessity-based 
definition has trouble accounting for cases in which the deciding court relies 
on multiple alternative rationales. Such decisions are problematic under the 
necessity-based definition because the precedent-setting court could, by 
hypothesis, have premised its decision solely on only one of its alternative 
 
curiam) (desegregating the bus system of Montgomery, Alabama), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 
(M.D. Ala. 1956); Mayor of Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (per curiam) (desegregat-
ing public beaches), aff’g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955). Although the Court’s opinion in 
Brown could have been read to suggest a narrower holding confined to the public 
schooling context, such a reading was no longer available to lower courts after the per 
curiam decisions were handed down. See Paul G. Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Rule 
of Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 531, 549 (1961) (observing that Brown “rested squarely and 
peculiarly on the finding that segregation in public schools resulted in harmful, 
discriminatory effects on Negro children” but noting that “in view of” the “later per 
curiam decisions, it must now be inferred that the school desegregation decision really 
was grounded on a broader principle, namely that all segregation legislation is invalid” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 143. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 130, at 1037 (noting the risk that courts 
might attempt to set forth law for future cases based on hypotheticals unconnected to 
the facts of the present case). 
 144. See id. at 957-58 (noting the absence of any accepted definition or test for distinguishing 
holdings from dicta). 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text 
(discussing the prohibition on advisory opinions). 
 146. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 130, at 1056 (characterizing the necessity-focused 
definition of “dicta” as “[t]he most influential”); see also, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 
1308, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]hat which is not necessary to the decision of a case is 
dicta.”). 
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rationales.147 Thus neither of the alternative rationales can be said to have been 
truly “necessary” to the disposition.148 As a matter of practice, courts routinely 
treat both prongs of an alternative rationale as part of the holding.149 
Recognizing the limits of the necessity-based definition, scholars have 
proposed alternative formulations of the holding-dicta distinction that do  
not depend on strict logical necessity.150 But even these alternative accounts 
generally recognize the centrality of the precedent-setting court’s judgment—
its ultimate disposition in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant—in 
setting the parameters that define the line that separates holding from dicta.151  
B. What It Means to “Follow the Result” of a Plurality Decision 
1. Plurality decisions as incompletely theorized agreements 
The distinctive feature of a plurality decision is, as noted above, the 
existence of a majority agreement on the judgment in a particular case without 
a corresponding agreement on the underlying rationale that supports that 
judgment.152 Such decisions thus reflect a particular species of “incompletely 
theorized agreement”—a phrase coined by Cass Sunstein to describe instances 
where decisionmakers are able to reach agreement on a particular proposition 
or result without reaching comprehensive agreement on the reasons that 
explain the agreed-upon resolution.153  
 
 147. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 130, at 1056-58 (characterizing the necessity-
based definition of dicta as “the easiest to falsify” and using the problem of alternative 
rationales as the principal illustration of its inadequacy).  
 148. Id.  
 149. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) 
(“[A]lternative holdings are binding precedent and not obiter dictum.”). 
 150. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 139, at 185 (“Although the standard formulation [of 
the holding/dicta distinction] is in terms of ‘necessary to the resolution of the case,’ in 
the United States at least ‘important in’ is substantially more accurate.” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004))); Abramowicz 
& Stearns, supra note 130, at 1065 (defending an alternative formulation under which 
classification as a “holding” would be reserved for “those propositions along the chosen 
decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the 
facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment”). 
 151. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 130, at 1026 (“[U]nless the judicial system is 
willing to invite upon itself claims of complete disingenuousness, a subsequent court 
will need to reconcile its ruling with the earlier case.”); Adam N. Steinman, To Say What 
the Law Is: Rules, Results and the Dangers of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 
1783-84 (2013) (“Even those who argue in favor of rule-based stare decisis . . . typically 
argue that there should also be a duty to reconcile results.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 152. See supra note 2. 
 153. See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1733, 1739-40 (1995) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements]; see also 
footnote continued on next page 
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Incompletely theorized agreements come in many forms. Some involve 
incomplete specification, reflecting general agreement on some relatively 
abstract principle—such as equality or freedom of speech—without 
corresponding agreement on how such principles apply to particular cases.154 
Others involve agreement on some midlevel principle without agreement on 
either the more general theory that justifies that principle or the proper 
application of that principle to the particular facts.155 A third variety, and the 
one that is most centrally relevant to the present inquiry, involves 
“incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes, accompanied by 
agreements on the low-level principles that account for them.” 156  Such 
agreements avoid the need to reach consensus on abstract theories or 
principles—a point at which agreement may be difficult or even impossible to 
achieve—by lowering the level of generality.157 By focusing more particularly 
on the bottom-line outcome (that is, “who wins and who loses a case”) as well as 
“a set of reasons” for that outcome “that typically do not venture far from the 
case at hand,” judges may be able to more easily reach consensus.158 
Plurality decisions involve a similar dynamic. But whereas the types of 
incompletely theorized judgments Sunstein takes as his focus involve 
agreement on both case-level outcomes and the “low-level principles” 
supporting those outcomes, plurality decisions involve agreement on outcomes 
alone.159 Such decisions are not, however, equivalent to unexplained rulings, 
which leave lower courts wholly at sea in determining the basis for  
the Supreme Court’s decision.160 Rather, plurality decisions typically come 
accompanied by opinions setting forth the reasons given by the particular 
Justices who joined in the judgment as to why they believed that judgment was 
appropriate. These reasons necessarily diverge from one another in some 
particulars—such divergence being the defining feature of a plurality decision. 
But they will rarely be narrowly circumscribed by every particular factual 
detail that happens to have been present in the particular dispute that the 
Court is called upon to decide.  
 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 11-14; F. Andrew Hessick & Jathan P. McLaughlin, Judicial 
Logrolling, 65 FLA. L. REV. 443, 468-69 (2013) (noting that plurality decisions involve 
incompletely theorized agreements).  
 154. See Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 153, at 1739. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. at 1740. 
 157. Id. at 1740-41. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 1740; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 13 (emphasizing that “[i]ncompletely 
theorized agreements are by no means unaccompanied by reasons”). 
 160. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties with extracting 
precedential guidance from unexplained rulings).  
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Reasons are by nature more general than the particular judgments they are 
offered as reasons for.161 In offering a reason for a decision, decisionmakers not 
only explain their decision to the affected individuals but also identify the 
decision as a member of a broader class of decisions supported by the same 
reason. Thus, to take a nonlegal example, a parent who tells a child that she can 
stay up late to watch a particular television program because the program is 
particularly educational implicitly signals a commitment, at least presumptive-
ly, to make similar exceptions to the ordinary bedtime for other programs of 
equivalent or higher educational value.162  
Similarly, a precedent-setting court that articulates a reason for its decision 
commits itself (and other courts bound by its precedents) to render decisions 
consistent with that reason in future cases, including cases that differ in 
significant respects from the precedent case. Thus, for example, if a precedent-
setting court explains its decision that a particular automobile manufacturer is 
liable to a remote purchaser for injuries caused by a negligently manufactured 
wheel because manufacturers of potentially dangerous products owe a duty of 
care to all persons who might foreseeably be harmed by their negligence,163 the 
court thereby commits itself (and other courts bound by its precedents) to 
render decisions consistent with that rationale in all future cases in which that 
rationale applies. A later case involving different factual circumstances— 
for example, a negligently manufactured soda bottle or coffee urn164—can 
nonetheless be recognized as materially “similar” to the precedent case because 
the rule identified by the precedent court as the basis for its decision would 
compel the same result in both cases. In this way, the practice of reason-giving 
is intimately connected with—and perhaps even essential to—the practice of 
precedent following.165  
 
 161. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 78 n.35 (2009) (“[R]easons are always more general than the outcomes that 
they are reasons for . . . .”); see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
633, 638 (1995) [hereinafter Schauer, Giving Reasons] (discussing the relationship 
between reason-giving and generality); Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 
supra note 153, at 1740 (engaging in a similar discussion).  
 162. See Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 161, at 649. The commitments created in this 
way provide an independent reason to act in a particular manner in the future but may 
be outweighed by other competing reasons. Id. at 643 n.25 (“What I have a reason to do 
is not necessarily what I should do, all things considered.”).  
 163. E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
 164. E.g., Hoenig v. Cent. Stamping Co., 6 N.E.2d 415, 415-16 (N.Y. 1936) (per curiam) 
(extending MacPherson to a case involving a negligently manufactured coffee urn); 
Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 181 N.E. 576, 577-78 (N.Y. 1932) (applying MacPherson to a 
case involving a soda bottle).  
 165. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (suggesting that the process of precedent following “cannot 
footnote continued on next page 
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Where multiple decisionmakers are involved, the matter becomes 
somewhat more complex, particularly where the decisionmakers provide 
different reasons for their agreed-upon judgment. But the basic structure of the 
analysis is the same. Consider a variation on the above-described bedtime 
hypothetical in which the child approaches each of her two parents separately 
to seek permission to stay up late. The response of the first parent is identical 
to the one described above, emphasizing the educational value of the program 
as the reason. The second parent likewise agrees to the request but instead 
offers as a reason the fact that there is no school the next day. Though both 
parents agree to the request, their respective reasons diverge in important 
respects.  
But despite this disagreement, the child is not left in the same position she 
would have been in had her parents each simply nodded their heads without 
explanation. At a minimum, the parents have collectively committed 
themselves, at least presumptively, to granting the child’s request in any future 
circumstance where both of their respective reasons are satisfied: that is, where 
the program in question exhibits sufficient educational value and does not fall 
on a school night.  
Of course, this convergence of reasons does not provide complete guidance. 
For example, if the child wishes to watch a future program with clear 
educational value on the night before a school day, the prior decision and the 
reasons given for that decision will not suffice to determine whether the 
request should be granted.166 But incomplete guidance is not the same as no 
guidance. Despite their incomplete overlap, the reasons given for the prior 
decision nonetheless provide meaningful guidance regarding an important 
category of future cases that do not involve either the specific program in 
question or the particular night in question. 
2. Distinguishing depth from width 
The possibility of extracting meaningful guidance from an incompletely 
theorized agreement that lacks a single, mutually agreed-upon rationale 
illustrates the importance of a distinction that Sunstein draws between the 
 
really get underway unless the precedent judge . . . does something to present her 
decision in an articulate light that allows subsequent judges to go to work on it”). 
 166. There might be some meta-rule in place that would resolve the uncertainty. For 
example, there might be an agreed-upon default rule that both parents’ assent must be 
obtained to exceed the bedtime, resulting in the request’s denial. Alternatively, a meta-
rule might specify that either parent can grant permission unilaterally. But such a 
default rule may not exist, perhaps because the parents failed to consider the question 
or considered such a rule but could not agree on what the appropriate meta-rule should 
be. Cf. infra notes 257-71 and accompanying text (considering the question of default 
rules applicable to plurality precedent). 
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“depth” of judicial decisions and their “width.”167 In Sunstein’s terminology, 
“depth” refers to the comprehensiveness of the decision’s  
theoretical foundations.168 Incompletely theorized agreements are, by their 
nature, “shallow rather than deep,” reflecting surface-level agreements on 
outcomes without comprehensive agreement on their underlying founda-
tions.169  
But such shallowness need not entail narrowness. “Narrowness,” in 
Sunstein’s terminology, signals the range of outcomes or situations covered by 
a particular decision.170 As Sunstein recognizes, it is possible for a decision to be 
both shallow and wide, lacking a deep theoretical grounding but nonetheless 
extending to a potentially broad range of future cases.171 This distinction is 
significant because while the depth of a Supreme Court decision may have 
some effect on the scope of precedential constraint, understanding its width 
will typically be much more important to assessing the degree of precedential 
constraint it will exert on lower courts.172  
The distinction between depth and width is well illustrated by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago.173 McDonald involved a 
constitutional challenge to a municipal ordinance that “effectively bann[ed] 
handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside[d] in” Chicago.174 
Two years earlier, the Court had invalidated a substantially similar District of 
Columbia ordinance as a violation of the individual right to keep and bear arms 
under the Second Amendment.175 The question presented in McDonald was 
whether the Second Amendment should be deemed “incorporated” against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.176  
Five Justices agreed that the Second Amendment should be incorporated 
against the states, but they divided as to the appropriate rationale for that 
decision. Justice Alito authored a plurality opinion, joined by three other 
Justices, which concluded that the Second Amendment was incorporated 
 
 167. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 26, at 16 (emphasizing “depth” and “width” as distinct 
dimensions along which decisions may be analyzed). 
 168. Id. at 13. 
 169. Id. at 11-14 (formatting altered). 
 170. Id. at 10. 
 171. Id. at 18. 
 172. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2009) (observing that the width (or narrowness) of a Supreme Court 
decision, rather than its depth, “appears to have the most immediate impact on the 
lower federal and state courts”). 
 173. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 174. Id. at 750. 
 175. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573, 635 (2008). 
 176. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767. 
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through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.177 Justice Thomas, 
who provided the fifth vote in favor of incorporation, explicitly rejected the 
plurality’s due process rationale and concluded instead that incorporation 
should be accomplished through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.178 Four dissenters would have rejected both of the asserted 
rationales for incorporation, finding the asserted Second Amendment rights 
not applicable to the states under either the Due Process Clause or the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.179 
Tabulating the votes cast by the Justices on each of the relevant issues in 
McDonald reveals the existence of a voting paradox.180 Eight Justices—the four 
plurality Justices and the four dissenters—rejected the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as a basis for incorporation, while five Justices—the four dissenters and 
Justice Thomas—would have refused to incorporate the Second Amendment 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. But despite the 
negative majority votes on each of these two asserted rationales for 
incorporation, a majority of the Court nonetheless concluded that incorpora-
tion was appropriate and, on that basis, held the challenged ordinance 
invalid.181 
In theory, these features of the McDonald decision would seem to present a 
challenging task for lower courts seeking guidance from the Court’s decision. 
Neither Justice Alito’s plurality opinion nor Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
reflected a logically entailed subset of the other. The plurality’s due process 
rationale was arguably broader in that it would extend protection to all 
“persons”—not just citizens—while the alternative Privileges or Immunities 
Clause rationale favored by Justice Thomas might open the door to protecting 
additional rights beyond those previously recognized under the  
Court’s incorporation jurisprudence.182 The incomplete overlap between the 
judgment-supportive rationales would thus seem to render unworkable the 
implicit consensus approach to discerning the narrowest grounds of the 
Court’s decision. The existence of a revealed voting paradox in the case 
likewise renders the fifth vote approach to Marks similarly unworkable.183 
And while the issue-by-issue approach might, in principle, provide some 
 
 177. See id. at 758-59 (plurality opinion); id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 178. Id. at 805-06 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 179. Id. at 858-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 912-13 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 180. See, e.g., David S. Cohen, McDonald’s Paradoxical Legacy: State Restrictions of Non-Citizens’ 
Gun Rights, 71 MD. L. REV. 1219, 1220-22 (2012) (describing the voting paradox in 
McDonald). 
 181. Id. at 1222. 
 182. Id. at 1224-25. 
 183. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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guidance to the lower courts, that guidance points to a set of legal conclusions 
that conflict with the Court’s specific judgment—namely, that neither the Due 
Process Clause nor the Privileges or Immunities Clause supports incorporation.  
But despite these seeming theoretical difficulties, lower courts have not 
struggled to extract guidance from the decision. To the contrary, lower courts 
have given little outward sign of even recognizing McDonald as a case calling 
for analysis under the Marks framework.184 What accounts for the striking 
dearth of lower court confusion over McDonald while other, similarly 
“paradoxical” decisions have so vexed those courts?  
The most plausible explanation derives from the substantial domain of 
conceptual overlap between the due process rationale endorsed by the plurality 
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause rationale endorsed by Justice Thomas. 
As noted above, the degree of overlap between the two rationales is not 
complete. But the areas of nonoverlap exist only at the margins—in cases 
involving either noncitizens or rights claims not previously endorsed under 
the Court’s incorporation doctrine—leaving in place a substantial core of 
agreement among the judgment-supportive rationales.  
McDonald is thus an example of a plurality decision that is both shallow 
and wide. Although Justice Alito’s plurality opinion and Justice Thomas’s sole 
concurrence reflect important points of theoretical divergence, they will 
converge on the same practical result in the vast majority of future cases to 
which McDonald might conceivably apply. In particular, in any future case 
involving a claim of Second Amendment rights (or other previously 
incorporated rights) asserted by a U.S. citizen, the two rationales will point to 
the same result, leaving lower courts free to apply the decision without having 
to choose between the two.185 
McDonald is not unique in this regard. Consider another well-known 
Supreme Court decision involving a voting paradox—National Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.186 Tidewater involved the constitutionality of a 
 
 184. A Westlaw search for decisions citing both McDonald and Marks returned only a single 
result. See Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 16-847 (Jan. 5, 2017). Though the opinion announcing the Third Circuit’s en banc 
decision in Binderup cited both McDonald and Marks, that opinion did not apply the 
narrowest grounds doctrine to determine the holding of McDonald. Instead, the opinion 
referred to Marks and the narrowest grounds doctrine in the course of describing the 
precedential significance of the en banc court’s own fractured decision in Binderup. Id. 
at 356. 
 185. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGowan, 982 N.E.2d 495, 498 n.5 (Mass. 2013) (“[A]ny 
distinction between the plurality’s and Justice Thomas’s approach to incorporation [in 
McDonald] is immaterial where, as here, the defendant is both a person and a citizen of 
the United States.”).  
 186. 337 U.S. 582 (1949); see also Post & Salop, supra note 96, at 748 (describing Tidewater as 
“[p]erhaps the most famous example” of a case involving a revealed voting paradox). 
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statute conferring diversity jurisdiction on federal district courts over disputes 
between residents of the District of Columbia and residents of a state.187 Five 
Justices concluded that the statute was constitutional but divided between two 
separate rationales. Three Justices concluded that the statute exceeded the 
scope of the diversity jurisdiction contemplated by Article III, which makes no 
mention of the District of Columbia, but nonetheless held that the statute was a 
permissible exercise of Congress’s Article I power to legislate for the 
District.188 The two remaining Justices who voted to uphold the statute 
specifically rejected this Article I rationale but nonetheless concluded that the 
District could be considered a “State” for purposes of the Article III Diversity 
Clause.189 The four dissenting Justices rejected both of these rationales and 
would have found the statute unconstitutional.190 Thus, as in McDonald, the 
Court awarded a judgment based on an outcome-level vote that was 
inconsistent with the way a majority of the Justices had voted on each of the 
two alternative legal theories that were necessary to that judgment.191  
The scope of agreement between the two judgment-supportive opinions in 
Tidewater is somewhat narrower than the agreement between the Justices in 
McDonald. The novel Article I rationale embraced by the three-Justice Tidewater 
plurality might open the courts to a multitude of purely state law claims that 
would be barred by the more conventional understanding of Article III 
embraced by the remaining Justices in that case (including the two who joined 
in the judgment on other grounds).192 But though many commentators have 
despaired of extracting any meaningful precedential guidance from the deeply 
fractured opinions in Tidewater,193 lower courts have found surprisingly little 
practical difficulty in applying Tidewater to the actual cases that have come 
before them.  
In a case decided shortly after Tidewater, the Ninth Circuit easily concluded 
that the Supreme Court’s decision supported upholding the same federal 
 
 187. 337 U.S. at 583-84 (plurality opinion). 
 188. Id. at 588, 603-04. 
 189. Id. at 604, 607-08, 625-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
 190. See id. at 646 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 191. See Post & Salop, supra note 96, at 748-49. 
 192. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 1926-27 (2004) (characterizing the plurality’s position as 
“com[ing] close to outright jurisdictional apostasy” and as “a challenge to the accepted 
portrait of federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction”). 
 193. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 820 
n.41 (1982) (“What does stare decisis compel the Court to do the next time District 
residents file such a ‘diversity’ suit and the same problem is presented?”); Novak, supra 
note 112, at 771 (“There seems to be no easy way to extract any coherent precedential 
principles from a case like Tidewater.”). 
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diversity statute with respect to cases involving residents of Hawaii, which was 
then still a federal territory.194 The Ninth Circuit determined that “[t]he 
reasons assigned by the two groups of Justices who concurred in the result” in 
Tidewater both applied with equal force to residents of the federal territories as 
they did to District of Columbia residents.195 The court thus concluded that 
jurisdiction was appropriate.196 The Seventh Circuit in a later case reached the 
same conclusion with regard to residents of Puerto Rico, another territory.197  
Other lower courts have used a similar method—that is, avoiding the need 
to choose between competing opinions from the plurality case by determining 
that each of the judgment-supportive rationales would point to the same result 
in the particular case before them—to determine the binding effect of other 
seemingly confounding Supreme Court decisions.198  
3. Connecting results to reasons 
As discussed above, the traditional conception of the holding-dicta 
distinction conceives of “holdings” as limited to the judgment of the precedent-
setting court and those portions of the court’s opinion that were necessary to 
that judgment.199 Thus, in a paradigmatic Supreme Court opinion—with 
majority agreement on both outcome and rationale—the “holding” or ratio 
should be susceptible to distillation into a statement of the following sort: “We 
hold for the prevailing party because the governing rule is Rule X and this case 
is an instance in which Rule X demands such judgment.” A later court bound by 
that holding would thus be bound to follow not only the specific result in the 
case (that is, the judgment in favor of the prevailing party) but also the reason 
for that judgment (that is, each of the propositions following the word “because” 
in the preceding sentence). 
 
 194. Siegmund v. Gen. Commodities Corp., 175 F.2d 952, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1949). 
 195. Id. at 953. 
 196. Id. at 953-54. 
 197. Detres v. Lions Bldg. Corp., 234 F.2d 596, 601-03 (7th Cir. 1956); see also, e.g., Greene v. 
Teffeteller, 90 F. Supp. 387, 388 (E.D. Tenn. 1950) (concluding that Tidewater supported 
upholding jurisdiction over suits involving D.C. residents under a separate diversity 
statute). 
 198. See, e.g., United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210-11 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Rapanos); 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 881, 883-84 (2d Cir. 
1981) (applying First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972)); 
Serv. Oil, Inc. v. State, 479 N.W.2d 815, 819-21 (N.D. 1992) (applying Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990)). 
 199. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text; see also Judge Pierre N. Leval, Judging 
Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, James Madison Lecture at the New York 
University School of Law (Oct. 18, 2005), in 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1256-57 (2006). 
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The absence of majority agreement on a judgment-supportive rationale in 
cases resulting in a plurality decision precludes such a straightforward 
distillation of a controlling ratio. But the fact that no single opinion, by itself, 
suffices to explain the Court’s judgment does not mean that lower courts are 
therefore incapable of answering the question why the Court chose to award 
the judgment it did. Rather, in answering that question, lower courts must look 
to the set of opinions in the precedent case that were collectively necessary for 
the Court to reach its judgment. Such a survey of opinions will reveal multiple 
alternative rationales that necessarily diverge from one another in some 
respects. But such judgment-supportive rationales will also, by necessity, 
converge with one another in some respects, at least insofar as was necessary to 
determine the specific judgment in the precedent case.  
A lower court is not, therefore, left in the same position it would have been 
in had the Supreme Court simply issued its judgment without explanation. In 
that circumstance, the lower court would be left largely unconstrained in 
selecting an imagined rationale on which the precedent Court might have based 
its ruling.200 In a plurality decision, by contrast, the lower court has available 
to it information from which to determine the rationale—or, more accurately, 
the set of rationales—on which the precedent Court actually did base its ruling. 
By looking to the convergent reasoning of the opinions that were collec-
tively necessary to the precedent case judgment, a lower court seeking to 
understand why the winning party won and the losing party lost should 
usually be able to answer that question. For example, where the precedent case 
involves a plurality decision in which the Justices concurring in the judgment 
split their votes between two competing precedential rules—Rule X and Rule 
Y—the Court’s reason for decision should be susceptible to a formulation of the 
following sort: “The prevailing party won because the governing rule was either 
Rule X or Rule Y and the precedent case was an instance in which both Rule X 
and Rule Y demanded such judgment.” Thus, for example, in the McDonald case 
discussed above in Part II.B.2, the petitioner was able to prevail because his case 
happened to be one in which both the plurality’s due process theory and Justice 
Thomas’s competing privileges or immunities theory pointed to a judgment in 
his favor.201  
Where a subsequent case falls within an area of overlap that would be 
resolved the same way under each of the alternative judgment-supportive 
rationales, the task for the precedent-following court is relatively straightfor-
 
 200. See infra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing the precedential effect of 
unexplained Supreme Court decisions); see also, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY 
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE 184 (1991) (emphasizing that decisionmaking under such conditions is 
“substantially non-constraining”).  
 201. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text (discussing McDonald).  
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ward. As the examples discussed above in Part II.B.2 show, where a subsequent 
case involves facts that would call for the same resolution regardless of which 
rationale is chosen, the lower court can avoid the need to choose between them.  
Of course, this reconciliation strategy will not be available in every case. 
Sometimes, the choice between two competing rationales may be critical to 
determining how a later case should be resolved. At this point, the guidance 
offered by the plurality decision runs out. Because the judgment in the 
precedent case would have been equally valid if either of the rationales asserted 
by the concurring Justices were correct, the traditional common law notion of 
the ratio decidendi supplies no criteria by which to determine which of the 
competing rationales the lower court should accept.  
But even in this category of cases, the plurality decision would continue to 
exert some meaningful precedential constraint on the lower courts. Though 
the lower court judge would be largely unconstrained in choosing between 
Rule X and Rule Y, she would not be free to rationalize her decision in a manner 
that would produce results that neither Rule X nor Rule Y could support. In 
other words, in rationalizing her decisions, the lower court judge must account 
for the domain of shared agreement on results defined by the respective 
rationales that were necessary to the precedent case’s judgment.202 
 Thus, in a subsequent case where both Rule X and Rule Y would compel 
the lower court to reach the same result, the court would not be free to choose 
a rationale that would lead to a different result. Nor would the lower court be 
free to rationalize the approach in some other way that might preserve 
consistency with the specific result in the precedent case while ignoring the 
actual reasons that were provided for that decision. Thus, even in cases where 
the plurality precedent does not compel a specific result, the decision’s 
precedential force can nonetheless narrow the “feasible choice set” available to 
lower courts and the resulting discretionary space within which their 
decisionmaking may proceed.203  
 
 202. As Jeremy Sheff has recently observed, legal rules can be “understood to define 
categories” of results that can be analyzed using the tools of mathematical set theory. 
Jeremy Sheff, Legal Sets 4-5 (St. John’s Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
No. 16-0019, 2016) (emphasis omitted), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2830918. The domain 
of shared agreement covered by two competing rationales for a judgment—Rationale A 
and Rationale B—consists of the intersection of the set of results produced by Rationale 
A and the set of results produced by Rationale B. See id. at 18 (“The intersection of two 
sets A and B . . . is defined as the set . . . containing all objects that are elements of both A 
and B.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 414-15 (2007) 
(discussing similar constraints using the metaphor of a “zone of discretion”); Jack 
Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 
DUKE L.J. 1531, 1548-49 (2009) (discussing precedent and professional norms of 
justification as constraints on the “feasible choice set” available to judges). 
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The precedential obligation of lower courts under this approach is closely 
related to the often-invoked idea that such courts are bound by the “specific 
result” in the precedent case.204 But for reasons that have already been discussed, 
the notion of a “specific result,” in and of itself, lacks sufficient content to guide 
decisionmaking absent further specification of how broadly or narrowly the 
relevant “result” should be characterized.205 Focusing on the domain of shared 
agreement between the judgment-supportive rationales responds to this 
concern by connecting the Court’s judgment to the broader set of reasons that 
were collectively necessary to that judgment, thereby supplying precedent-
following courts with criteria through which to assess the materiality of 
asserted factual similarities and differences between a later case and the earlier 
precedent-setting case.  
III. The Case for the Shared Agreement Approach to Plurality 
Precedent 
The foregoing Parts have described the three most prominent existing 
approaches to the Marks doctrine in the lower courts and laid out the basic 
framework of the alternative shared agreement approach. With a clear picture 
of these four alternatives in view, it is now possible to engage in a comparative 
assessment of which approach is best. This Part develops an affirmative case for 
the shared agreement approach as the appropriate conceptual framework for 
lower courts to use in addressing the problem of plurality precedent.  
Part III.A lays the groundwork for this argument by demonstrating the 
shared agreement approach’s consistency with the Supreme Court’s very 
limited existing case law discussing the narrowest grounds doctrine. Part III.B 
then highlights two traditional criteria of precedential legitimacy that the 
Supreme Court has emphasized in other contexts to limit its capacity to 
prescribe binding precedential rules: the requirement that precedential 
statements be supported by a majority of the Court’s members and the 
requirement that such statements directly support the judgment that was 
rendered in the precedent-setting case. Part III.C demonstrates that only the 
shared agreement approach provides a solution to the problem of plurality 
precedent that conforms to these two requirements and provides a workable 
rule of decision for virtually every plurality decision that lower courts are 
 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, 
J., dissenting in part) (asserting, without elaboration, that where no single unambigu-
ously “narrowest” opinion exists, “the only binding aspect of a splintered decision is its 
specific result” (quoting Anker Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 
170 (3d Cir. 1999))). 
 205. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of the “facts-plus-
outcome” conception of precedent). 
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likely to face. Finally, Part III.D responds to the concern that the shared 
agreement approach provides insufficient guidance to lower courts regarding 
the content of governing law. Though such guidance concerns are not wholly 
without merit, they do not provide a convincing argument for rejecting the 
shared agreement approach in favor of any of the alternative approaches to the 
narrowest grounds rule—at least not in the absence of clear and specific 
direction from the Supreme Court requiring that result. 
A. Consistency with Marks 
An important threshold question for any lower court considering how to 
approach the problem of plurality precedent is whether a proposed approach 
can be reconciled with the language and holding of the Marks decision itself. 
Even if a lower court concludes that the Marks Court adopted an unwise, or 
even unworkable, theory of plurality precedent, that view would not relieve 
the lower court of its obligation to follow the theory that the Court itself 
prescribed.206 Any theory of plurality precedent that conflicts with the explicit 
language of Marks is thus practically unavailable to the judges of the lower 
courts—at least until the Supreme Court itself chooses to reconsider the 
precedential status of that decision.  
Fortunately, the shared agreement approach to plurality precedent fits 
comfortably with the Court’s decision in Marks. The Marks Court instructed 
lower courts to identify the “holding of the Court” by looking to the “position 
taken by those [Justices] who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.”207 Many lower courts have interpreted this language as requiring 
them to identify a single narrowest opinion from the precedent case and treat 
that opinion as fully binding.208 But nothing in the Marks decision itself 
 
 206. The methodological nature of the Marks Court’s comments regarding plurality 
decisions’ precedential status might raise questions regarding whether such comments 
were part of the case’s holding or more properly categorized as dicta. See, e.g., Randy J. 
Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 193 (2014) (discussing the preceden-
tial status of “doctrinal frameworks” that “sweep far beyond the facts at hand to address 
other situations not concurrently before the court”). But this argument is easily 
disposed of. As discussed above, virtually any decision supported by a reason will sweep 
at least somewhat more broadly than the particular decision itself. See supra notes 161-
65 and accompanying text. Nor does the methodological nature of the guidance offered 
by the Court make any obvious difference to categorizing the Court’s statements as 
either holdings or dicta. See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE 
L.J. 644, 705-07 (2014) (considering and rejecting the argument that stare decisis norms 
do not extend to methodological commitments).  
 207. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 208. See, e.g., United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2009) (interpreting Marks as 
“instruct[ing] lower courts to choose the ‘narrowest’ concurring opinion” in the 
footnote continued on next page 
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compels that interpretation. An alternative, and equally plausible, understand-
ing of Marks is that precedential effect is reserved for the “reasoning within the 
concurring opinions that a majority of the concurring Justices support.”209 On 
this latter understanding, a purportedly “narrowest” opinion from a plurality 
case is binding on the lower courts only insofar as it reflects views to which a 
majority of the concurring Justices have logically committed themselves by 
virtue of their respective opinions in the precedent case. 
Of course, in Marks itself the Court did single out a particular opinion—
namely, Justice Brennan’s Memoirs plurality—as the “controlling opinion” from 
that case.210 But given the context in which that case arose, this conclusion was 
fully consistent with the shared agreement understanding of the narrowest 
grounds rule. Recall that the three judgment-supportive opinions in Memoirs 
aligned in a simple continuum from narrowest to broadest.211 For the Marks 
defendants’ due process claim to succeed, all they needed to establish was that 
the Memoirs decision had effected a change in the governing First Amendment 
standard that was at least as speech-protective as the standard articulated in the 
plurality opinion.212 But the three other concurring Justices in Memoirs—
Justices Black, Douglas, and Stewart—would necessarily have found the 
petitioners’ conviction unconstitutional even if the prosecution had been able 
to satisfy Justice Brennan’s standard. In the circumstances in which the Court 
considered the issue, therefore, treating Justice Brennan’s opinion as 
“controlling” was fully consistent with requiring a majority consensus among 
the concurring Justices for binding precedential force to attach. 
The Supreme Court’s subsequent cases addressing the Marks framework 
are consistent with this conclusion. As noted above, the Court has addressed 
the narrowest grounds doctrine in only a handful of cases since Marks was 
handed down.213 And though the Court has, in most of those cases, identified a 
particular opinion from the precedent case as controlling, each such decision is 
fully reconcilable with the majority-consensus understanding of Marks.  
Consider, for example, the Court’s recent opinion in Glossip v. Gross,214 
which concluded that the three-Justice plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees215 
 
precedent-setting case); Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541, 1543 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (referring 
to the “narrowest concurrence rule” prescribed by Marks). 
 209. James A. Bloom, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the 
Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1379 (2008) 
(noting this ambiguity in the Marks decision). 
 210. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. 
 211. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (describing the opinions in Memoirs). 
 212. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. 
 214. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 215. 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
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reflected the narrowest, and therefore controlling, grounds of the Baze 
decision.216 In Baze, the plurality had concluded that a challenged method of 
execution would be deemed cruel and unusual only if the challenger could 
prove the existence of a feasible alternative method that would “significantly 
reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” 217  Justices Scalia and Thomas 
concurred in that judgment but said they would only uphold a method-of-
execution challenge in those cases where the challenged method had been 
“deliberately designed to inflict pain.”218 Granting the seemingly reasonable 
assumption that a method of execution “deliberately designed” to inflict 
unnecessary pain would also pose a “substantial risk” of inflicting such pain, the 
standard endorsed by the Baze plurality and the alternative standard endorsed 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas would necessarily point to the same result in any 
future case where the plurality would deem an execution method constitution-
ally permissible.219 
The Court’s decision in Panetti v. Quarterman220 provides a further illustra-
tion. Panetti addressed the constitutional adequacy of procedures through 
which a prisoner could challenge his mental competence to face execution.221 
In a prior plurality decision, Ford v. Wainwright, a majority of the Justices had 
rejected one procedural regime for making that determination but adopted 
different standards in explaining why that procedure was deficient.222 A four-
Justice plurality opinion concluded that “the ascertainment of a prisoner’s 
sanity as a predicate to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards 
than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding.” 223 
Concurring in part and in the judgment, Justice Powell endorsed a less 
stringent procedural framework, requiring only that a prisoner contesting his 
 
 216. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738 n.2. 
 217. 553 U.S. at 51-52 (plurality opinion). 
 218. Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 219. See Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing that “any lethal 
injection protocol constitutionally acceptable to the plurality would invariably pass” 
the standard endorsed by Justices Scalia and Thomas). Justices Scalia and Thomas made 
clear that the only punishments they believed would violate the Eighth Amendment 
were those that were “designed to inflict torture as a way of enhancing a death sentence” 
and that were “intended to produce a penalty worse than death.” 553 U.S. at 102 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, even if a petitioner could establish that 
a challenged punishment had been designed for deliberately cruel purposes, the absence 
of a feasible alternative method of execution—the focus of the plurality’s rationale—
would almost certainly be determinative under their standard as well. 
 220. 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 221. Id. at 935. 
 222. 477 U.S. 399, 413-17 (1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 424-25 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 223. Id. at 411-12 (plurality opinion). 
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competence be given a fair hearing that accorded with the requirements of 
“basic fairness.”224 The Panetti Court concluded that Justice Powell’s opinion set 
“the minimum procedures a State must provide to a prisoner raising a Ford-
based competency claim” and that, by failing to provide such procedures, the 
state defendant in that case had violated “clearly established” federal law.225 But 
as in Glossip and Marks, the Panetti Court’s decision to treat Justice Powell’s 
concurrence as binding was fully consistent with the majority consensus 
understanding of the narrowest grounds rule. Because the plurality Justices 
would necessarily agree that a procedure failing Justice Powell’s relaxed due 
process test would also fail their own preferred standard, the Court had no 
occasion to consider what the precedential effect of the decision would be in a 
case where the plurality and concurrence pointed to different results.  
The remaining three cases in which a majority of the Court invoked the 
narrowest grounds rule to single out a particular opinion as “controlling” are 
all to similar effect.226 In no case has the Court directly held that lower courts 
 
 224. Id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 225. 551 U.S. at 949 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 
 226. See O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 160-62 (1997) (interpreting Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U.S. 349 (1977)); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (interpreting Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 
750, 764 n.9 (1988) (interpreting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).  
  In Gardner, the case interpreted in O’Dell, six Justices had agreed that judicial 
consideration of evidence that had not been made available to the defendant during the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. 430 U.S. 
at 362 (plurality opinion). The three-Justice plurality opinion concluded that the 
defendant “was denied due process of law when the death sentence was imposed, at 
least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or 
explain.” Id. But Justice White’s sole concurrence differed from the three-Justice 
plurality opinion by emphasizing the specific nature of the evidence at issue—evidence 
relating to the “character and record of the individual offender,” id. at 364 (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 
(1976))—and the centrality of the Eighth Amendment to his analysis, rather than the 
plurality’s more general due process reasoning, id. at 363-64. Given the more limited 
scope of Justice White’s concurrence in Gardner, the O’Dell Court held that the 
subsequent extension of the plurality’s reasoning in a later case had not “followed 
ineluctably” from Gardner’s holding and that retrospective application of the later case 
was thus not required. O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 160-62; cf. United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 
607 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Rogers, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(describing O’Dell as “consistent with” a “‘subset’ interpretation of the Marks rule”).  
  Although the O’Dell Court characterized Justice White’s concurrence as having 
“provid[ed] the narrowest grounds of decision among the Justices whose votes were 
necessary to the judgment,” 521 U.S. at 160, Justice White’s opinion and the plurality 
opinion in Gardner collectively accounted for only four votes. The O’Dell Court did not 
mention the remaining two Justices who joined in the majority—Justice Blackmun and 
Chief Justice Burger. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment separately in a 
cursory opinion suggesting invalidation of the defendant’s sentence was compelled by 
two of the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment decisions. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364 
footnote continued on next page 
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are obliged to treat as binding an opinion reflecting the views of a minority of 
Justices in those circumstances where majority consensus was absent. To the 
contrary, in the only two cases invoking Marks that might have required it to 
rule in this way, the Court instead concluded the narrowest grounds analysis 
was not “useful” and dispensed with any attempt to extract a binding 
precedential rule from the original decision.227 In other words, each of the 
Supreme Court’s prior decisions singling out a particular opinion as 
controlling has involved a nested rationale scenario where the identification of 
a single “narrowest” opinion is relatively straightforward.228 
Thus, rather than standing in tension with the Marks Court’s command, 
the shared agreement approach fits comfortably with both the language and 
specific holding of that case as well as with the Court’s other post-Marks 
 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The plurality opinion in Gardner did not 
mention either of the decisions referred to by Justice Blackmun, but one of those 
cases—Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)—was the principal authority 
relied on in Justice White’s concurrence, 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment). It is therefore conceivable that the O’Dell majority viewed Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion as expressing a view substantially similar to Justice White’s. Cf. 
Neuenkirchen, supra note 46, at 415 (concluding that the basis for Justice Blackmun’s 
Garner concurrence “must be similar to the position expressed by Justice White, who 
also relied on Woodson”). Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without 
providing any explanation at all. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362 (Burger, C.J., concurring in 
the judgment). But given the way the other opinions in the case aligned with one 
another, his vote could not have affected the outcome as the Court’s decision would 
have been the same even if Chief Justice Burger had dissented or abstained.  
  In Romano, the Court singled out Justice O’Connor’s sole concurrence from Caldwell as 
the narrowest and therefore controlling opinion. Romano, 512 U.S. at 9. Justice 
O’Connor would have concluded that evidence could not be admitted at the sentencing 
phase of a capital trial where the evidence both diminished the jurors’ sense of 
responsibility and was inaccurate and misleading. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). A four-Justice plurality would 
have dispensed with the latter requirement by mandating the exclusion of any evidence 
that diminished jurors’ sense of responsibility, even if such evidence were accurate and 
were not misleading. See id. at 335-36 (plurality opinion). 
  In City of Lakewood, the Court identified the Kovacs plurality opinion as the controlling 
opinion. 486 U.S. at 764 n.9. Only one other Justice concurred in the Kovacs judgment—
Justice Jackson, who argued that the Court should have repudiated its holding in an 
earlier case, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), rather than adopt the plurality’s more 
speech-protective standard, 336 U.S. at 97-98 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 227. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (declining to conduct the Marks 
analysis to determine whether a rationale “set forth in part of [a concurring] opinion 
joined by no other Justice” was binding on later courts); Nichols v. United States, 511 
U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994) (dispensing with the Marks analysis after observing that “[a] 
number of Courts of Appeals have decided that there is no lowest common denomina-
tor or ‘narrowest grounds’ that represents the Court’s holding” in the prior plurality 
case).  
 228. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (describing the distinction between 
opinions involving nested rationales and those involving non-nested rationales). 
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decisions engaging the narrowest grounds inquiry. But the same might 
arguably be said of other ways of understanding the Court’s various statements 
regarding the precedential significance of plurality decisions. 229  It will 
therefore be useful to consider which of the various approaches to the Marks 
rule best accords with broadly accepted conventions of precedential legitimacy 
that apply outside the plurality context. 
B. Majoritarianism and Judgment-Supportiveness as Criteria of 
Precedential Legitimacy 
In the domain of federal law, the Supreme Court has long claimed for itself 
the ultimate authority to “say what the law is.”230 Because the stare decisis 
effect of its rulings binds lower court judges absolutely,231 a decision of the 
Supreme Court has the practical effect of “making” law that is every bit as 
authoritative for a lower court judge as a statute or constitutional provision.232 
But knowing that the Supreme Court possesses institutional authority to 
“make” law in this way tells us relatively little about how such law is to be 
made. The Supreme Court, “like Congress, is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’” 233—a 
multimember institution whose expression of collective intent depends on a 
system of technical rules for aggregating the views of its nine individual 
members.234 Understanding the precedential effect of the Court’s pronounce-
ments—particularly in the plurality decision context—thus requires a basic 
understanding of the background rules and norms through which the Court 
exercises its law-declaring authority. 
 
 229. See, e.g., STEARNS, supra note 88, at 124-29 (arguing that Marks supports the fifth vote 
approach to plurality precedent). 
 230. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 231. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (“It is this Court’s 
responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty 
of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.”). 
 232. See Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. Lecture at Harvard University (Feb. 14, 1989), in 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176-77 
(1989) (“In a judicial system such as ours, in which judges are bound, not only by the 
text of code or Constitution, but also by the prior decisions of superior courts, . . . 
courts have the capacity to ‘make’ law.”). 
 233. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of 
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 550 (2005). 
 234. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 356 (2012) (“Multi-member institutions . . . can do nothing—
nothing at all!—unless certain basic social-choice rules are in place within these 
institutions.” (formatting altered)). 
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Unfortunately, the precise content of these background rules is surprising-
ly difficult to pin down.235 There is no judicial equivalent to the constitutional-
ly prescribed lawmaking procedures established for Congress in Article I, 
Section 7.236 Instead, the mechanisms through which the Supreme Court 
exercises its power to establish binding precedent are governed by a  
set of largely unwritten conventions that have developed over time.237 The 
unwritten nature of such conventions complicates efforts to discern their 
content, as does the traditional reluctance of common law courts to 
acknowledge their own lawmaking function.238 There are, however, at least 
two broadly accepted conventions of Supreme Court decisionmaking that are 
highly relevant to assessing the precedential significance of the Court’s 
pronouncements: the Court’s commitment to majority decisionmaking and its 
limitation of binding precedential force to propositions that directly support 
its judgments in adjudicated cases.  
Though nothing in the Constitution explicitly requires the Supreme Court 
to decide cases by majority vote, the commitment to majority  
decisionmaking is among the most deeply rooted features of the Court’s  
institutional practices.239 This commitment to majority decisionmaking means 
that precedential status is reserved for opinions that have received the assent of 
at least a majority of the Court’s members. While pronouncements by 
individual Justices or groups of Justices comprising less than a majority may be 
 
 235. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 151, at 1738 (“[T]he ground rules for discerning the law-
generating content and scope of a judicial decision remain remarkably murky.”). 
 236. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (setting out basic lawmaking procedures for Congress), 
with id. art. III (lacking any comparable procedures). 
 237. Certain of the Court’s institutional practices, such as its life-tenured judges and its 
limited jurisdiction, are specified by the Constitution. See id. art. III, §§ 1-2. Others, such 
as the number of Justices who compose the Court and the minimum number necessary 
for a quorum, are prescribed by federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2015). But many others, 
including those surveyed in this Subpart, are governed by “unwritten” legal conven-
tions. See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1797, 1801 (describing “unwritten” legal rules as those that “have no single and 
authoritative textual source, no pedigree tracing their validity back to a written 
ancestor” (emphasis omitted)). 
 238. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Recognition?, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION 
AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 327, 335 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 
2009) (attributing lack of “clear, shared, and public rules of change, so far as changes in 
the law wrought by the judiciary are concerned” partly to “profound[]” societal 
ambivalence “about judges’ making and changing law”). 
 239. See AMAR, supra note 234, at 357-61 (“From its first day to the present day, the 
[Supreme] Court has routinely followed the majority-rule principle without even 
appearing to give the matter much thought.”). 
Plurality Decisions & Precedential Constraint 
69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
846 
looked to for persuasive value, they do not bind either the Supreme Court itself 
in subsequent cases or the judges of the lower courts.240 
The requirement that precedential effect be limited to propositions that 
support the Court’s judgments finds its roots in two of the Court’s longstand-
ing institutional practices—namely, its prohibition on advisory opinions and 
its adherence to the traditional common law distinction between holdings and 
dicta. The Court’s prohibition on advisory opinions is almost as old as the 
Court itself.241 The Court has grounded its refusal to issue such opinions in the 
text of Article III.242 And though arguably not an “inevitable” reading of that 
provision’s language,243 the prohibition on advisory opinions is among the 
most deeply rooted of the Court’s institutional practices.244 
Only slightly less deeply rooted is the Supreme Court’s institutional 
commitment to the common law distinction between holdings and dicta. As 
discussed above, the holding-dicta distinction presupposes a distinction 
between statements that lead the Court to its judgment and those that do not, 
reserving binding precedential force for the former and treating the latter  
as merely persuasive.245 In practice, the significance of this distinction is 
somewhat muted by the notorious blurriness of the line separating holdings 
from dicta246 as well as the willingness of many lower courts to follow  
 
 240. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987) (“As the plurality 
opinion in [Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982),] did not represent the views of a 
majority of the Court, we are not bound by its reasoning.” (footnote omitted)).  
 241. See William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices’ Most Significant Opinion, 29 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 173, 173 (2002) (noting that the prohibition is conventionally traced to a 
1793 letter from the Justices to President Washington refusing a request for legal 
advice regarding certain foreign affairs controversies). 
 242. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (“[T]he implicit policies embodied in 
Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against advisory opinions on federal 
courts.”). 
 243. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (acknowledging that litigant standing 
requirements are “not a linguistically inevitable conclusion” from the text of Article 
III); Note, Advisory Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over American 
Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2064, 2067 (2011) (“This construction of the federal 
judicial power was not inevitable. . . . English judges had a longstanding practice of 
issuing advisory opinions upon the monarch’s request.”).  
 244. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65-66 (7th ed. 
2011) (calling the ban on advisory opinions “the oldest and most consistent thread in 
the federal law of justiciability”). 
 245. See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 206, at 187 (describing the “stark dichotomy” between 
holdings and dicta as key to the “classic account of precedential scope”); see also supra 
notes 143-46 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction).  
 246. See supra notes 147, 151 and accompanying text (noting the absence of any universally 
agreed-upon test or definition for distinguishing holdings from dicta). 
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even acknowledged Supreme Court dicta.247 But the Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the distinction as a meaningful constraint on its own authority to 
establish binding precedent—both for itself248 and for lower courts.249 Indeed, 
some version of the distinction seems essential to the practical efficacy of the 
Court’s ban on issuing advisory opinions. Because at least some litigated cases in 
virtually every area of law are bound to be brought before the Court in any 
given year, a Court that could issue binding pronouncements on matters 
nonessential to resolving the parties’ dispute would enjoy the same practical 
authority as a Court explicitly empowered to issue advisory opinions.250 The 
holding-dicta distinction can thus be seen as an important corollary of the 
limited decisional authority that the Court has long understood Article III to 
require.251  
C. Implications for Plurality Precedent 
The Court’s institutional commitment to majority decisionmaking and its 
refusal to extend binding effect to statements that do not directly support its 
judgments suggest a particular conception of precedential authority. Under 
this conception, the power to establish binding precedent resides with the 
majority of Justices whose votes were collectively necessary to the Court’s 
 
 247. See, e.g., Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 6 F.3d 856, 861 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (arguing 
that circuit courts should treat “[c]arefully considered language of the Supreme Court” 
as authoritative even if such language is “technically dictum”); see also United States v. 
Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Doughty, 6 F.3d at 861 n.3). 
 248. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1368 (2013) (“[W]e are not 
necessarily bound by dicta should more complete argument demonstrate that the dicta 
is not correct.”); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (“[W]e are not 
bound to follow our dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully 
debated.”); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935) (“[D]icta . . . may be 
followed if sufficiently persuasive but . . . are not controlling . . . .” (italics omitted)).  
 249. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426-31 (2008) (observing that the majority 
of lower courts had correctly determined that they were not bound by overbroad dicta 
in a prior Supreme Court opinion); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) 
(declaring that only “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e Supreme] Court’s 
decisions” can constitute “clearly established” federal law for purposes of federal habeas 
relief).  
 250. See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 130, at 1019-20 (observing that a judicial 
system lacking any norms or rules requiring judges to “limit their case dispositions to 
resolving issues implicated by material case facts” would “be akin to a legislature in 
which any single legislator could pass a bill”).  
 251. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 132, at 1997-98 (contending that the distinction between 
holdings and dicta carries Article III implications); Leval, supra note 199, at 1259 
(contending that judicial “lawmaking through proclamation of dicta” is constitutional-
ly illegitimate). 
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judgment.252 The Court’s written opinions, which explain its judgments, of 
course generate stare decisis effects that bind the judges of the lower courts. But 
“[a] judgment is no less a judgment, and no less final, if it is unaccompanied by a 
statement of reasons.”253 The Court has instructed that even its unexplained 
dispositions create binding precedential obligations for lower court judges.254 
Moreover, the Court has emphasized time and again that its authority to 
declare binding law for other legal actors, including the judges of the lower 
courts, is merely a byproduct of its primary responsibility of issuing judgments 
in contested cases.255  
In most cases, this conception of precedent-setting authority is not 
particularly controversial. Since the time of Chief Justice Marshall, the Court 
has explained the large majority of its decisions through an official “opinion of 
the Court” that both declares the majority’s judgment in the case and provides a 
set of reasons that each Justice in the majority assents to by joining the 
opinion.256 But absent a clear statement by the majority Justices regarding the 
rationale or rationales they mutually relied upon in reaching their collective 
 
 252. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 123, 126 (1999) (observing that “[t]he operative legal act performed by a court is the 
entry of a judgment” and that written opinions merely provide “an explanation of 
reasons for that judgment”).  
 253. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1328 (1996).  
 254. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975) (“[L]ower courts are bound by 
summary decisions by this Court . . . .”). While the Court has made clear that lower 
courts must accord binding effect to its summary dispositions, it has warned that such 
dispositions should not be read as adopting the reasoning of the judicial decision below, 
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam), and has cautioned that 
“[a]scertaining the reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of 
real substance,” Hicks, 422 U.S. at 345 n.14. 
 255. The Court has explained: 
The duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons 
or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it. When, in 
determining such rights, it becomes necessary to give an opinion upon a question of law, that 
opinion may have weight as a precedent for future decisions. But the court is not empowered 
to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future 
cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the 
case before it. 
  California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893); see also, e.g., 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“If a dispute is not a proper 
case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in 
the course of doing so.”); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (explaining 
that the power of judicial review exists only to the extent necessary to determine “the 
rights of the litigants in justiciable controversies”). 
 256. See generally G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-
Century Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1467-68 (2006) (describing the emergence of the 
“opinion of the Court” practice under Chief Justice Ellsworth and its later entrench-
ment under Chief Justice Marshall).  
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judgment, lower courts must fall back on some default rule for determining the 
precedential effect of the Court’s ruling. Marks itself can be seen as an initial 
attempt by the Court to establish such a default rule. But for the reasons 
discussed above, Marks is fairly read to prescribe, at most, a narrow rule for 
dealing with a particular type of plurality decision involving logically “nested” 
rationales.257  
But the fact that Marks itself did not prescribe a clear default rule for 
determining the precedential significance of the Court’s fractured majority 
decisions does not mean that no such default rule exists. The presumption that 
the Supreme Court—like most multimember institutions—only possesses 
authority to act through a majority vote of its members underlies a 
longstanding default rule for dealing with cases where a majority decision 
cannot be reached. Where the Court divides equally on the proper resolution 
of a particular case, the long-settled default rule requires the affirmance of the 
judgment below but does not establish any new binding precedential rule for 
future cases.258 “Because a tie vote demonstrates that no majority favors a 
particular disposition, the resulting disposition is the one that leaves the 
preexisting legal landscape intact.”259 Thus, under ordinary circumstances, the 
Supreme Court’s inability to decide on the resolution of a particular case is 
practically equivalent to a decision to not create binding precedent at all.260 
Of course, in cases that result in a plurality decision, there is a majority 
decision for action by the Court, and the Marks Court was thus correct to intuit 
that such decisions should produce at least some change in background legal 
rules. But the necessary majority agreement in such cases is limited to 
agreement on the appropriate judgment, not the broader judgment-supportive 
rationale.  
Of the existing approaches to Marks reflected in the lower courts’ jurispru-
dence, only the implicit consensus approach conforms to this particular 
conception of precedential authority. This approach insists on both a genuine 
 
 257. See supra Parts I.B.1 (describing the “implicit consensus” understanding of Marks), III.A 
(describing the Supreme Court’s application of the narrowest grounds doctrine).  
 258. See, e.g., Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 107, 110 (1868) (“It has long been the 
doctrine in this country and in England, where courts consist of several members, that 
no affirmative action can be had in a cause where the judges are equally divided in 
opinion as to the judgment to be rendered or order to be made.”). 
 259. Michael Coenen, Comment, Original Jurisdiction Deadlocks, 118 YALE L.J. 1003, 1008 
(2009); see also, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 652 & n.38 (2002) (describing the rule as an application of the 
Latin maxim “semper praesumitur pro negante, that is, it is always to be presumed in 
favor of the negative”). 
 260. For the now-obligatory citation for nondecision as a form of decision, see RUSH, 
Freewill, on PERMANENT WAVES (Moon Records 1980): “If you choose not to decide / 
You still have made a choice.” 
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agreement among a numerical majority of the Justices and requires that the 
particular majority whose votes are considered “concurred in the judgment.”261 
But for reasons already discussed, this approach is capable of providing useful 
guidance to lower courts only with respect to a limited subset of plurality 
decisions where the concurring Justices’ opinions happen to align with one 
another in a particular way.262 The shared agreement approach, by contrast, 
provides a framework for determining the precedential significance of 
decisions that do not conform to the “nested” rationale paradigm that the 
implicit consensus approach envisions. By demonstrating how the concurring 
majority’s shared agreement on the judgment can generate precedential 
consequences even in the absence of a comprehensive, mutually agreed-upon 
majority rationale, the shared agreement approach allows lower courts to 
extract meaningful precedential guidance from virtually all plurality decisions, 
regardless of how deeply fractured the Court’s decision might be. 
By contrast, both the fifth vote approach and the issue-by-issue approach 
transfer the power to establish precedent away from the judgment-supportive 
majority and toward some other faction of the Court. The fifth vote approach 
effectively places the power to establish precedent in the hands of the median 
Justice, presumably on the theory that her opinion reflects the position that a 
majority of the Justices would most likely have settled on had they been 
“forced to choose” a single rationale.263 But plurality decisions are only possible 
because the Justices are not “forced to choose” in this way and have chosen not 
to choose a single opinion as the authoritative position of the Court.264 The 
deciding majority, of course, has the capacity to converge on a single majority 
 
 261. Cf. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (indicating that the “narrowest 
grounds” of a decision should be determined by looking to the views of Justices who 
“concurred in the judgments” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 
(plurality opinion))). 
 262. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the “implicit consensus” approach to Marks). 
 263. See, e.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam) (interpreting Marks to require “lower-court judges . . . to follow the narrowest 
ground to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose” 
(emphasis added)).  
 264. By contrast, a longstanding, informal convention of the Court demands that the 
Justices’ collective votes always lead to a conclusive outcome in the case—for example, 
an affirmance, a reversal, or remand: where an initial vote reveals a three-way split 
between such options, some Justices have switched their votes to produce a majority-
supported result. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“It has been our practice in a case coming to us from a lower federal court 
to enter a judgment commanding that court to conduct any further proceedings 
pursuant to a specific mandate. That prior practice has, on occasion, made it necessary 
for Justices to join a judgment that did not conform to their own views.”); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 553 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, 
J., concurring in the result).  
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rationale, and history furnishes examples of Justices voting contrary to their 
sincerely held substantive positions in order to produce a majority opinion for 
the Court.265 But acknowledging that the Justices could converge on the median 
Justice’s position if they were forced to do so does not justify the conclusion 
that lower courts must act as if the majority actually did so.266  
The issue-by-issue approach likewise transfers power away from the 
deciding majority by allowing a differently constituted majority—consisting of 
the dissenters and some subset of the concurring Justices—to establish 
precedent on discrete propositions of law. Unlike the fifth vote approach, the 
issue-by-issue approach at least ensures the existence of a majority agreement 
on the propositions to be treated as binding. But it does not insist on agreement 
among the particular majority whose votes were collectively necessary to the 
Court’s judgment. This distinction is significant because the specification of a 
majority decision rule is necessarily ambiguous and incomplete unless one is 
prepared to answer the equally important question: “A majority of whom?”267  
The implicit answer suggested by the issue-by-issue approach is that the 
relevant “majority” consists of a simple majority of all Justices participating in 
the precedent-setting case, irrespective of how those Justices cast their votes.268 
But this approach conflicts with the requirement that precedential statements 
must also be offered in support of the Court’s judgment in the precedent case. 
Majority-supported dicta are not considered binding on the judges of the lower 
 
 265. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2317-19 (1999) (discussing formation of such “majority-opinion 
coalition[s]”). Such convergence tends to occur around the median Justice’s position, 
and social choice theory suggests reasons for predicting that particular outcome. Id. at 
2320. But such “[c]onvergence on a center position . . . is not guaranteed” because “the 
effects of small-group dynamics” might influence individual Justices’ voting behavior 
in ways that are difficult to predict. Id.  
 266. As one perceptive commenter observed in critiquing Stearns’s social choice argument 
for the fifth vote approach to Marks: 
[T]he problem with Stearns’s social choice justification for the [fifth vote approach] is that it 
assumes that it is necessary, or at least desirable, to select one opinion as a “winner” in Supreme 
Court plurality decisions. In other words, defending the Marks doctrine as a Condorcet-
producing rule does justify the “winners” that Marks selects, but does not justify the act of 
selecting a “winner” in the first place. 
  Joseph M. Cacace, Note, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A 
Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 97, 127-28 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
 267. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Majority Rules, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 643, 643-47 (2007) 
(observing that “[a] fully-specified voting rule must state both a multiplier and a 
multiplicand” and that “[t]he choice of multiplicand is at least as important as the choice 
of a multiplier”). 
 268. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 112, at 768 (asserting that in the dual majority context “the 
technical alignment of the Justices is irrelevant” because “what is important is the 
presence of agreement by an actual majority of the Court”). 
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courts merely because they have been assented to by a majority. To the 
contrary, it is only with respect to majority-supported statements that the 
distinction between holdings and dicta can do any meaningful work.269 And 
like dicta, statements in dissenting opinions are neither “necessary to” nor even 
supportive of the judgment in the precedent-setting case.270 The issue-by-issue 
approach thus stands in sharp tension with the traditional notion that binding 
precedential force attaches only to those statements that lead the precedent-
setting court to its judgment. 
As noted above, the decision procedures employed by the Supreme Court 
are largely governed by informal custom and convention. Nothing in the text 
of the Constitution obviously and unambiguously requires the Supreme Court 
to adhere to a majority decision procedure or establishes the judgment-
supportive criterion as a limit on the Court’s precedential authority. Were a 
majority of the Court to clearly and unambiguously specify an alternative 
decision rule for addressing the problem of plurality precedent, there might 
well be a plausible argument that lower courts would be bound to follow that 
rule in their own decisions.271  
But in the absence of such clear specification, the ordinary default rules for 
assessing the precedential significance of the Court’s decisions apply. Those 
default rules both require majority agreement for action by the Supreme Court 
and limit the precedential effect of the Court’s pronouncements to those 
statements offered in support of its judgments. Failure to satisfy either of these 
conditions leaves the preexisting state of the law unchanged. The shared 
agreement approach accords with this default rule by framing a theory of 
precedential obligation that maps directly onto the deciding majority’s actual 
shared agreement regarding why the precedent case’s judgment was correct. 
 
 269. See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 921 (9th Cir. 2001) (Tashima, J., concurring) 
(“By definition, dictum is an unnecessary statement made by the majority; unless a 
statement is made by a majority, there is no need to engage in an analysis of whether 
that particular statement is dictum or a holding.”). 
 270. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, with Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of Clean Water 
Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 81, 94 
(L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007) (arguing that a “dissent, like dicta from a majority  
opinion, . . . does not—indeed cannot—form part of the holding of the Court”); A.M. 
Honoré, Note, Ratio Decidendi: Judge and Court, 71 LAW Q. REV. 196, 198 (1955) 
(“[O]pinions of [dissenting] judges cannot form part of the ratio decidendi of a case 
[because] they are not reasons for the order made by the court . . . .”).  
 271. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the precedential status of the 
Supreme Court’s methodological guidance).  
Plurality Decisions & Precedential Constraint 
69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017) 
853 
D. But What About Guidance? 
A persistent criticism of plurality decisions is that such decisions “create 
confusion” in the law “by failing to provide clear guidance to the lower 
courts.”272 One prominent way of understanding the Marks Court’s instruction 
is as an effort to respond to such guidance concerns by allowing lower courts to 
identify a single precedential opinion in as many cases as possible.273 And while 
this is hardly the only—or even the most plausible—way to read the Marks 
Court’s instruction,274 it is certainly understandable that some might strive to 
interpret the Court’s directive to maximize precedential guidance and 
constraint.  
Both the fifth vote approach and the issue-by-issue approach respond to 
this guidance concern by attempting to single out a particular rationale from 
the precedent case as controlling. Under the shared agreement approach, by 
contrast, the judges of the inferior courts will—at least in most cases—possess a 
limited degree of discretion in choosing between two or more judgment-
supportive rationales.275 The shared agreement approach’s acknowledgment of 
a limited domain of discretion for lower court judges might thus raise concerns 
among those who highly value the determinacy and uniformity of federal law. 
But such uniformity concerns do not provide a particularly convincing 
argument against the shared agreement approach for several reasons. 
First, as a purely descriptive matter, the Supreme Court—and the federal 
judicial system more broadly—places less of a value on national uniformity 
than is often assumed. Many of the Court’s institutional practices—including 
the limited size of its discretionary docket; its toleration of persistent, 
unresolved circuit splits; and its frequent practice of issuing narrow, fact-
specific majority opinions that fail to clearly guide the lower courts—have 
been criticized as contributing to the disuniformity of national law.276 Other 
 
 272. Corley, supra note 11, at 40; see also, e.g., John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical 
Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 62 (suggesting that 
some plurality decisions do “more to confuse the current state of the law than to clarify 
it”). 
 273. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991) (asserting 
that the “principal objective of” the Marks rule, “promot[ing] predictability” in the law, 
“requires that, whenever possible, there be a single legal standard for the lower courts 
to apply in similar cases”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); 
STEARNS, supra note 88, at 135 (asserting that one of the “overriding objectives” of the 
Marks Court’s directive was to “ensur[e] an identifiable holding in the maximum 
number of fractured . . . decisions”). 
 274. See supra Part III.A. 
 275. But see infra notes 306-08 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of prior 
precedent as an additional constraint on lower courts’ discretion). 
 276. On the Court’s shrinking appellate docket, see, for example, Ryan J. Owens & David A. 
Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 
footnote continued on next page 
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institutional features of the federal judicial system—such as the geographical 
division of the federal courts of appeals and the absence of intercircuit stare 
decisis—suggest a broader, systemic acceptance of disuniformity in federal 
law.277  
Second, and relatedly, if the Supreme Court were inclined to maximize its 
precedential guidance, there are far clearer and more effective ways for it to 
achieve that objective than through Marks’s cryptic narrowest grounds 
doctrine. Perhaps most obviously, the Court could simply refrain from  
issuing plurality decisions completely.278 Though the types of substantive 
jurisprudential divisions that drive such fractured decisions are likely 
impossible to eradicate entirely, a Court that placed a sufficiently high value on 
clarity and guidance might develop an informal norm requiring some Justices 
to switch their votes in order to produce a majority-supporting opinion.279  
Alternatively, the Court could itself engage in the precedential analysis 
and provide “a brief per curiam notice at the beginning of [its] decision” 
instructing lower courts “which opinion is controlling.”280 Of course, this 
latter approach would require the Justices themselves to agree upon some 
decision procedure for selecting the authoritative opinion. The Justices might, 
for example, adopt the fifth vote interpretation as their official position.281 But 
they might instead choose to simply follow the concurring opinion that 
received the most votes282 or the opinion reflecting the views of the Court’s 
 
(2012). On its willingness to tolerate longstanding circuit splits, see, for example, 
Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1139-40 (2012). On its practice of issuing narrow, fact-
specific rulings that provide limited guidance for future cases, see, for example, Grove, 
supra note 172, at 57-58; and Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: 
Morse v Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207. 
 277. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1610 (2008) (noting steps 
Congress could take to enhance uniformity were it so inclined).  
 278. See, e.g., Davis & Reynolds, supra note 272, at 81-86 (urging the Court to refrain from 
issuing plurality decisions whenever possible). 
 279. Cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 354 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining the 
Justice’s decision to concur in a majority rationale with which he substantively 
disagreed because of the need to avoid an “unacceptable” level of uncertainty in the 
governing legal rule). By contrast, the Court has developed such an informal vote-
switching practice for cases where vote-switching is necessary to produce a majority-
supported dispositional ruling in a case. See supra note 264 (describing this convention).  
 280. Jerome I. Braun, Five Minus Four Equals Nine: Understanding Fractured Supreme Court 
Decisions, and Some Ways the Court Could Make Them Less Vexing, 246 F.R.D. 265, 272 
(2008) (suggesting such a reform and how it could operate). 
 281. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing the fifth vote approach to Marks). 
 282. See, e.g., Douglas J. Whaley, Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-
Majority Judicial Decisions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 370, 376 (1968) (arguing for a rule requiring 
that “the opinion that the most nondissenting judges vote for” be treated as preceden-
tial to promote judicial compromise). 
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most senior Justice.283 They might even conceivably choose a controlling 
opinion by drawing lots.284 Any of these methods would respond to the 
concern regarding precedential guidance. The fact that the Court has instead 
chosen to continue issuing plurality decisions in the absence of a clear rule for 
determining their precedential effect suggests the Court’s willingness to 
entrust lower court judges with a significant degree of practical discretion in 
extracting precedential guidance from such decisions.  
Third, the nature of lower court discretion contemplated by the shared 
agreement approach is not meaningfully different from the nature of the 
discretion lower courts already exercise in myriad decisionmaking contexts. 
Consider, for example, a Supreme Court majority opinion that resolves a case 
on narrow and highly fact-specific grounds.285 Such “minimalist” decisions 
inevitably bestow upon lower courts a substantial degree of discretion in 
determining whether and how they should apply as precedents in a future 
case.286 Such discretion is, of course, cabined by the particular language and 
holding of the Court’s narrow decision, as well as by other relevant legal 
materials, such as the broader universe of Supreme Court case law, potentially 
relevant statutes and regulations, and the lower court’s own earlier 
precedents.287 But even after all those sources have been taken into account, 
lower courts will often possess some (limited) capacity to choose between two or 
more plausible understandings of governing law.288 In other words, the judge 
 
 283. Cf. Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 87, 102 n.29 (2002) (describing an Israeli law providing that “[w]here there is no 
majority for any one opinion in a civil matter, the view of the senior judge shall 
prevail” (quoting Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, § 80, 38 LSI 271 (1983-
84))). 
 284. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 67-70 
(2009) (discussing certain costs and benefits of randomizing merits determinations by 
courts). 
 285. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 276, at 207-08 (identifying the Court’s decision in Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), as “exemplify[ing] th[e] disturbing trend” of “narrow and 
fact-specific” Supreme Court rulings “that may in theory produce the right outcome for 
the particular case before the Court, but . . . provid[e] virtually no assistance for lower 
courts”). 
 286. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 172, at 28-29 (“[I]n our current judiciary, a minimalist 
Supreme Court opinion serves to delegate substantial decision-making responsibility 
to the Court’s judicial inferiors.”). 
 287. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 203, at 409 (“When judges decide cases, the body of applicable 
legal rules—statutes, regulations, and prior precedents—constitute the relevant 
constraints on their decisionmaking.”). 
 288. Id. at 410 (“[E]ven judges with a strong legal preference for following superior court 
precedent will encounter cases in which ‘the guidance of authoritative legal rules runs 
out’ and therefore find themselves with discretion to decide.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 239 (1990))). 
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is “not bound to decide the question one way rather than another” because 
there simply is “no wrong answer to the questions posed” or “at least, there is 
no officially wrong answer” that is clearly discernible at the time the judge must 
make her decision.289 
Likewise, under the shared agreement approach, a lower court judge 
would not be left wholly unconstrained in choosing which of the judgment-
supportive opinions from the precedential decision to follow. Such a judge 
presumably would not, for example, feel herself free to select one opinion over 
others based on the flip of a coin or the alphabetical order of the opinion 
authors’ names.290 Rather, she would likely feel herself compelled to offer an 
explanation for why she believed one of the opinions reflected a better view of 
the law or fit more comfortably within the surrounding universe of precedent 
and other governing legal sources.291 In explaining why the understanding of 
the law reflected in one of the articulated rationales is best, a lower court judge 
employing the shared agreement approach can thus be expected to act in much 
the same way as she would in other contexts where the legal system affords the 
judge discretion to reach more than one plausible result. And, as Pauline Kim 
observes, “when discretion in this sense exists, it ‘is quintessentially associated 
with variability of result.’”292 
Fourth, it is far from clear that binding precedential guidance from the 
Supreme Court necessarily represents the type of unqualified good that many 
critics of plurality decisions seem to imagine. While precedential guidance can 
undoubtedly offer important societal benefits, these benefits do not come 
without cost.293 Among the most obvious potentially undesirable consequences 
of precedent is that later decisionmakers may be constrained to reach 
 
 289. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 635, 637 (1971); see also, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The 
Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 378 (1975) (“[W]hen 
more than one result will widely be regarded as a satisfactory fulfillment of his judicial 
responsibilities then it does not make good sense to say that a judge is under a duty to 
reach one result rather than another; as far as the law is concerned, he has discretion to 
decide between them.”). 
 290. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 203, at 408 (“[D]iscretion . . . implies something more than mere 
choice. It suggests that a decision should be made not randomly or arbitrarily, but by 
exercising judgment in light of some applicable set of standards, guidelines, or values.”). 
 291. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 260-61 (1997) (discussing the im-
portance of professional norms of explanation and justification as a constraint on 
judicial decisionmaking). 
 292. Kim, supra note 203, at 410 (quoting George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 
DUKE L.J. 747, 748). 
 293. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While many consider 
the principle of binding authority indispensable[,] . . . it is important to note that it is 
not an unalloyed good.”). 
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substantively incorrect or undesirable results. 294 A practice of following 
precedent thus raises both the importance of identifying the “right” legal 
principle and the consequences of legal error because the precedent-setting 
court’s decision will control not only the present dispute but also some 
unknowable number of future disputes.  
Recognizing this danger of locking in potentially undesirable legal rules, 
the Justices have occasionally acknowledged that disuniformity at the lower 
court level may sometimes allow for desirable “percolation.”295 On this view, 
the Supreme Court’s own decisionmaking is thought to benefit from a 
temporary period of deliberation and experimentation in the lower courts. 
Such percolation may, for example, allow the Justices to see how lower courts 
address the relevant questions in a range of different factual settings296 and 
how the rules formulated by different circuit courts have worked in  
practice over time.297 The Justices’ decisionmaking may also benefit from the 
substantive “deliberation that occurs among lower courts as they respond to 
one another’s decisions.”298 
Such percolation might be viewed as particularly useful in the plurality 
decision context. By their nature, plurality decisions tend to involve legal 
issues as to which the governing legal standards are unclear and elite legal 
opinion is closely divided. The failure of a majority to coalesce on any single 
rationale is a powerful signal of the unsettled state of the governing doctrine. It 
is precisely in this context that arguments for a continued period of 
 
 294. See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 206, at 207-08 (“In both vertical and horizontal operation, 
precedent creates the risk of entrenching erroneous rules. When today’s court is 
compelled to accept yesterday’s unsound decision, society incurs a loss from the 
perpetuation of the incorrect rule.”). 
 295. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We have in 
many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of 
‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal appellate courts may yield 
a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.”); United 
States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (“Allowing only one final adjudication [on a 
specified legal issue] would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting 
several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants 
certiorari.”); Doni Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in 
a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 482-83 (2012) (discussing potential 
benefits of percolation). 
 296. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 163 (1985) (“[A] 
difficult question is more likely to be answered correctly if it is allowed to engage the 
attention of different sets of judges deciding factually different cases than if it is 
answered finally by the first panel to consider it.”).  
 297. See Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65 
(1998) (“[T]he passage of time during which there is a circuit split [may] create[] a record 
of the consequences of different legal regimes.”). 
 298. Gewirtzman, supra note 295, at 482-83.  
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percolation in the lower courts seem most persuasive.299 By allowing lower 
courts to continue working out for themselves the difficult legal issues that 
divided the Justices in the original plurality decision, the Supreme Court may 
gain important insights and information that can help crystallize a consensus 
regarding the appropriate rule of law when the Court ultimately decides to 
revisit the issue. 
The shared agreement approach facilitates the type of deliberation and 
experimentation that the percolation theory envisions. By encouraging (indeed, 
requiring) lower court judges to choose among the various judgment-
supportive rationales based on their own best understanding of background 
legal principles, the shared agreement approach focuses lower courts’ attention 
on the types of questions that are likely to be foremost in the Justices’ minds if 
and when they decide to revisit the underlying issue. The fifth vote approach 
and the issue-by-issue approach, by contrast, each direct lower courts’ attention 
away from the substantive merits and toward essentially arbitrary tests for 
selecting a particular opinion as controlling—tests that the Supreme Court 
itself has shown remarkably little interest in following or clarifying.300 To the 
extent percolation provides any meaningful practical benefits to the Supreme 
Court’s decisionmaking, the shared agreement approach thus holds out the 
greatest promise of allowing the judicial system to harness those benefits. 
Finally, even if one concludes that a more guidance-enhancing plurality 
precedent rule is desirable, an important institutional design question would 
remain regarding how best to implement that rule. For example, even if 
scholars and judges agreed that the judicial system as a whole would be better 
off if all lower court judges were to converge on the fifth vote approach, it 
would not necessarily follow that any particular lower court judge should use 
that approach in her own decisionmaking.301 If the chief benefit sought to be 
gained by adopting such an approach is national uniformity, that benefit will 
only be achieved if all lower court judges, or at least a substantial majority of 
them, converge on the same approach. But no individual judge acting on his or 
her own can ensure such national convergence.  
It is, of course, conceivable that the lower courts might converge on a 
particular approach to the narrowest grounds rule organically. But four 
 
 299. See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 53, at 45 (“Given the doctrinal disarray that 
leads to plurality opinions . . . , lower court judgment, experience, and argument are 
especially useful to the high court.”). 
 300. See supra Parts I.B.2 (describing the fifth vote approach), I.B.3 (describing the issue-by-
issue approach), III.A (describing the failure of the narrowest grounds rule to constrain 
the Court’s own decisionmaking). 
 301. See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
6-8 (2009) (describing the fallacy of division, which involves the assumption that what 
is true of a group must also be true of its members). 
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decades of experience with Marks suggests that such convergence is unlikely. In 
practice, the narrowest grounds rule has been at least as prone to generating 
circuit splits as it has to avoiding or resolving them.302 This experience 
suggests that a “bottom-up” approach to clarifying the meta-doctrine 
governing the interpretation of plurality decisions is likely to meet with little 
success. If the goal is to enhance the clarity and determinacy of resulting 
precedential rules, a “top-down” approach of precedential guidance delivered 
directly from the Supreme Court seems far more likely to achieve its objectives. 
In short, concerns about national uniformity and clear guidance to lower 
courts do not provide a convincing reason for lower courts to reject the shared 
agreement approach to plurality precedent. The shared agreement approach 
delivers clear precedential guidance to lower court judges regarding certain 
results they cannot reach and certain results they must reach. And though the 
approach does contemplate a limited domain of bounded discretion on the part 
of lower court judges in choosing between two or more judgment-supportive 
rationales, the nature of lower court discretion thus contemplated is not 
meaningfully different from that exercised by such courts in other contexts. 
Moreover, even if one concludes that the disuniformity costs of the shared 
agreement approach would be too great, both the institutional responsibility 
and the most plausible chance of practical success resides with the Supreme 
Court itself, not the judges of the lower courts.  
IV. Implementing the Shared Agreement Approach 
The foregoing Parts have focused on building the theoretical case for the 
shared agreement approach as the appropriate conceptual framework for 
determining the binding precedential force of Supreme Court plurality 
decisions. This Part demonstrates how the approach would work in practice by 
reference to a recent Supreme Court plurality decision—Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.303 Shady Grove provides a useful case study, as 
it involves both a fairly straightforward alignment of opinions and a single 
relevant question that the Court was asked to decide. The case also illustrates 
the nature of the discretion conferred on lower courts by the shared agreement 
approach and the role of other authoritative legal sources in defining the 
parameters of such discretion. 
Shady Grove involved the question whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, which specifies the conditions under which class actions “may be 
maintained” in federal court, allowed for certification of a class action asserting 
 
 302. See supra note 50 (collecting sources identifying circuit splits produced by different 
understandings of the Marks doctrine). 
 303. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
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state law claims that would not have been maintainable as a class action in the 
state’s own courts.304 This question, in turn, implicated a set of questions 
regarding the relationship between the federal courts and state substantive and 
procedural law that are generally classed together under the rubric of the “Erie 
doctrine.”305 To address such federal-state conflicts, the Court’s earlier Erie 
doctrine precedents had established a framework that required the Court to 
first determine whether Rule 23 “answers the question in dispute” and, if so, to 
then determine whether that Rule “exceed[ed]” the scope of the rulemaking 
authority delegated by Congress through the Rules Enabling Act.306 But the 
Justices in Shady Grove divided into three competing factions regarding the 
proper application of this framework to the particular case before them. 
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia and joined in full by three 
others, answered the first question in the affirmative, concluding that Rule 23 
spoke directly to the question whether a class action asserting the state law 
claims at issue was maintainable in federal court.307 Given this conclusion, the 
agreed-upon framework called for looking exclusively to Rule 23 to determine 
whether a class could be certified unless that Rule was invalid. Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion had little difficulty disposing of this latter point, concluding 
that, under prior case law—particularly the Court’s 1941 decision in Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co.308—a federal rule should be treated as per se valid so long as it 
“really regulat[es] procedure.”309  
In a sole opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality’s analysis on the first step of the two-
step framework and its conclusion regarding the validity and applicability of 
Rule 23 given the facts of the particular case.310 But unlike the plurality, Justice 
 
 304. Id. at 396 & n.2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)). 
 305. The Erie doctrine requires that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive 
law and federal procedural law. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 
(1996); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938). 
 306. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398 (plurality opinion) (first citing Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987); and then citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463-64 
(1965)); see also id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (adopting the same framework); id. at 437-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging this framework as controlling). 
 307. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398-99. Justice Stevens explicitly joined in the portion of the 
plurality opinion reflecting this discussion, rendering that portion of the opinion the 
official position of the Court. See id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 308. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 309. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion) (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14). 
 310. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Critical to 
Justice Stevens’s conclusion that Rule 23 could be properly applied to the facts of the 
parties’ dispute was his view that New York’s restriction on class certification had been 
adopted for procedural, rather than substantive, reasons. Id. at 436. 
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Stevens believed that the validity analysis required by the second step of the 
governing framework could not end with a conclusion that the federal rule 
“really regulated” procedure. Because the Rules Enabling Act explicitly 
provides that the federal rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify  
any substantive right,”311 Justice Stevens concluded that even an overtly 
procedural federal rule would not govern a particular case in which the rule 
would displace a state law that is so intertwined with a substantive state right 
or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created right.312 In 
effect, Justice Stevens advocated an approach under which the validity of 
particular federal procedural rules would be assessed on an “as-applied” basis, 
with the as-applied validity depending on the particular rule’s potential impact 
on particular state-created substantive rights.313  
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by the three remaining Justices, disagreed 
with both the plurality and Justice Stevens regarding the proper application of 
the first step of the two-part governing framework—that is, the determination 
whether Rule 23 answers the question in dispute.314 Unlike both Justice 
Stevens and the plurality, the dissenters saw no “inevitable collision” between 
the explicit terms of Rule 23 and the state law policy prohibiting class 
certification for certain categories of claims.315 Based on this conclusion, 
Justice Ginsburg and her fellow dissenters declined to address the step-two 
validity question that divided Justice Stevens and the plurality. Instead, the 
dissent applied a separate test used to determine whether federal or state law 
should control where there is no direct conflict with any federal rule and 
concluded that this analysis supported adhering to the New York restriction 
on class certification.316  
Shady Grove thus reflected a clear 4-1-4 split with Justice Stevens seeming 
to occupy the median point between the two more extreme factions: Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion, on the one hand, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, on 
the other.317 Most lower courts that have considered the issue have concluded 
that Justice Stevens’s concurrence reflects the controlling “narrowest grounds” 
 
 311. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2015). 
 312. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 313. See Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied 
Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181, 1185-90 (2011). 
 314. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 446-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 315. Id. at 449. 
 316. Id. at 452-58. 
 317. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent arguably signaled that Justice Stevens’s position was closer to 
her own than was Justice Scalia’s by noting that Justice Stevens had “stake[d] out 
common ground” with the dissenters regarding the need to read the federal rules with 
sensitivity to state interests. Id. at 442 n.2. 
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opinion under Marks—a conclusion consistent with the fifth vote approach to 
the narrowest grounds rule.318 But this conclusion highlights the legitimacy 
concerns inherent in the fifth vote approach. The invalidity analysis in Justice 
Stevens’s opinion was not endorsed by any other member of the Court.319  
The legitimacy concerns inherent in the fifth vote approach are exacerbat-
ed in Shady Grove by the role that preexisting precedent played in the Justices’ 
analysis. The disagreement between the plurality Justices and Justice Stevens 
was itself driven by conflicting understandings of the Court’s prior Erie 
doctrine case law, particularly Sibbach. The plurality Justices understood 
Sibbach as compelling their adoption of their wholesale approach to assessing 
the validity of a federal rule.320 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s opinion went so far as to 
accuse Justice Stevens of seeking to “overrule” Sibbach “or, what is the same, to 
rewrite it.”321 If the plurality’s understanding of Sibbach were correct, then the 
practical effect of recognizing Justice Stevens’s sole concurrence as the 
controlling opinion in Shady Grove would be to empower one Justice to 
overrule (or at least substantially narrow) a controlling Supreme Court 
precedent that was itself assented to by a majority of the Court. 
Under the shared agreement approach, by contrast, no lower court would 
have been bound to follow either Justice Stevens’s analysis or the plurality’s 
view. Rather, each of those rationales would be part of the feasible choice set 
from which lower courts could choose without violating their precedential 
obligation. But the lower courts’ discretion in this regard would not be wholly 
unfettered. As noted above, the disagreement that divided Justice Stevens from 
the plurality was itself driven in large part by conflicting understandings of 
what preexisting law—particularly Sibbach—required. A lower court forced to 
choose between the plurality’s wholesale approach to the rule validity analysis 
and the alternative as-applied approach endorsed by Justice Stevens would thus 
 
 318. See, e.g., James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC, 658 F.3d 1207, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(concluding that Justice Stevens’s concurrence was the controlling narrowest grounds 
opinion under Marks); Davenport v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1050 
(E.D. Mo. 2014) (stating that although the Eighth Circuit had not yet adopted Justice 
Stevens’s opinion, “the majority of federal courts to consider the issue have found that 
Justice Stevens’ opinion controls”). But see Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., 783 F.3d 1328, 
1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding that none of the opinions in Shady Grove is 
controlling for Marks purposes). 
 319. Though Justice Ginsburg’s dissent did not explicitly address the validity question that 
divided Justice Stevens from the plurality, at least one commenter has understood the 
dissenters’ refusal to join in Justice Stevens’s opinion as an implicit rejection of his 
validity analysis and an endorsement of the plurality’s more “conventional” approach. 
See Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
987, 1015 (2011) (interpreting the dissent to have “implicitly assented to the plurality’s 
understanding” of Sibbach).  
 320. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411-12 (plurality opinion). 
 321. Id. at 412. 
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be forced to confront this same question regarding the proper understanding of 
Sibbach.322  
Troublingly, however, those lower courts that have identified Justice 
Stevens’s Shady Grove opinion as controlling for Marks purposes have largely 
done so without giving any serious consideration to what Sibbach or the Court’s 
other Erie doctrine precedents had to say about the choice between the 
wholesale approach and the as-applied approach to the rule validity analysis.323 
Instead, those courts have tended to assume that Justice Stevens’s opinion 
controls regardless of that opinion’s consistency with the Court’s earlier Erie 
decisions.324  
The lower courts’ failure to give serious consideration to these questions is 
doubly unfortunate, as they implicate a set of pragmatic concerns that lower 
courts might be particularly well suited to decide. Lurking just below the 
surface of the interpretive disagreements that divided Justice Stevens from the 
plurality Justices was a set of more overtly pragmatic concerns regarding the 
likely practical impact of allowing as-applied validity challenges to particular 
federal rules. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the plurality Justices expressed 
concern about the difficulty that lower courts would encounter were they 
required to apply Justice Stevens’s proposed validity standard to the potentially 
“hundreds of state rules” to which that standard might conceivably apply.325 
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, denied that his approach would unduly 
burden the lower courts and contended that his approach would be no more 
burdensome than the alternative wholesale validity analysis endorsed by the 
plurality.326 But neither faction of Justices offered any empirical or even 
anecdotal support for their conflicting intuitions.  
 
 322. Compare, e.g., Clermont, supra note 319, at 1014 n.135 (concluding that “the Sibbach 
Court” had effectively “rejected” Justice Stevens’s view that a rule “deemed procedural 
at the federal level still must not impinge on matters deemed substantive at the state 
level”), with, e.g., Struve, supra note 313, at 1190 (contending that Sibbach does not 
foreclose as-applied review of rule validity). 
 323. See, e.g., James River Ins., 658 F.3d at 1217-18 (following Justice Stevens’s Shady Grove 
opinion without mentioning Sibbach); Davenport, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 1050 (doing the same); 
McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (doing the same); 
Bearden v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 3:09-1035, 2010 WL 3239285, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 16, 2010) (doing the same). 
 324. The few post-Shady Grove decisions that have specifically addressed the continuing 
significance of Sibbach have reached differing conclusions. Compare, e.g., Abbas v. 
Foreign Policy Grp., 783 F.3d 1328, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding that Sibbach 
requires wholesale assessment of rule validity), with, e.g., Phillips v. Philip Morris Cos., 
290 F.R.D. 476, 481 n.4 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (denying the applicability of Sibbach by 
following Justice Stevens’s more limited reading of Sibbach). 
 325. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 415 n.14 (plurality opinion). 
 326. Id. at 426 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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The lower courts stand in a much better position to assess the respective 
burdens of the two approaches. As the frontline responders tasked with 
implementing the Court’s procedural doctrines, lower courts—and particularly 
district courts—would bring to the task a wealth of hands-on experience that 
most members of the Court presently lack.327 If lower courts were to engage 
with this question directly—without any preconceived notion of being bound 
to follow one or the other of the Shady Grove opinions—their reactions might 
provide the Court with much clearer and more concrete evidence of the actual 
administrative burdens involved in the respective approaches. 
Unfortunately, the strength of any such signal that might be perceived 
from the lower courts’ actual reactions to Shady Grove is significantly muted by 
the fact that those courts have, for the most part, not understood themselves as 
enjoying the freedom to engage with such questions directly. Instead, most 
courts have focused on answering a different set of questions regarding the 
proper application of the Marks narrowest grounds rule. This myopic focus on 
the proper application of Marks drains their post-Shady Grove decisions of most 
of the practical epistemic value that they might otherwise have contributed to 
the Supreme Court’s future decisionmaking.328 
Conclusion 
Trying to understand the precedential effect of Supreme Court plurality 
decisions is a task that has confounded the lower courts for decades. The 
Court’s decision in Marks, though designed to clarify the precedential 
significance of such decisions, has instead exacerbated the confusion. But once 
plurality decisions are recognized and appreciated for what they are—namely, 
incompletely theorized judicial agreements on results unsupported by more 
comprehensive majority agreement on the governing rationale—much of this 
confusion melts away. Because only the result in the precedent case enjoys the 
support of the deciding majority, the result provides the natural focus of the 
lower courts’ precedential inquiry.  
Of course, a mere result in a single case provides minimal practical 
guidance to lower courts. But by looking to the majority’s partially 
overlapping and partially diverging reasons for that judgment, lower courts can 
identify a domain of shared agreement among the majority Justices regarding 
 
 327. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 
868 (2014) (“One would expect that . . . the average federal or state trial judge probably 
understands the consequences of various procedural and evidentiary rules better than 
the justices, most of whom have little or no trial experience.”). 
 328. See id. at 873 (demonstrating how differing understandings of the relevant question to 
be answered at the Supreme Court level and the lower court levels can impair the 
epistemic value the Court might glean from the lower courts’ decisions). 
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why that result was correct. Looking to this domain of shared agreement 
enables lower courts to identify a universe of results in future cases that they 
are required to reach as well as a corresponding universe of results they are 
forbidden from reaching. Understanding the domain of shared agreement can 
also help lower courts to identify the boundaries of their discretion to continue 
working through for themselves the challenging legal questions that divided 
the Court in the precedent case. As such, the shared agreement approach strikes 
the appropriate balance between precedential constraint and continued 
doctrinal growth and development. 
